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The Evolution and Decline of the
Effective-Vindication Doctrine in U.S.
Arbitration Law
Okezie Chukwumerije*

INTRODUCTION
This Article evaluates the role of the effective-vindication doctrine in
U.S. arbitration law. Conceived as a means of ensuring that arbitration is an
effective mechanism for vindicating federal statutory rights, the doctrine has
played an important role in promoting access to justice. However, the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest.1 has severely restricted the availability of the doctrine. This article
examines the broad policy implications of the Court’s narrow interpretation
of the doctrine.
Over the years, the Court has adopted an expansive interpretation of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2 As a result, it has broadened the reach and
scope of the Act beyond what was intended by its drafters. The Court has
interpreted the Act as reflecting both the “fundamental principle that
arbitration is a matter of contract,”3 and a “liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration.”4 Consequently, the Court has sought to put arbitration

* Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Houston, Texas. I wish to thank Devin
Vickers for her research assistance, and Rebecca Stewart for her helpful comments. All errors are
my own.
1. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)., 186 L. Ed. 2d 417, 2013
U.S. LEXIS 4700, 81 U.S.L.W. 4483, 163 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P10,607, 2013-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
P78,432, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 337, 2013 WL 3064410 (U.S. 2013).(2013).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (2006).
3. Rent-A-Ctr,., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).
4. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). It should
be noted that some observers have observed that the FAA was not intended to favor arbitration but
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agreements “on an equal footing with other contracts.”5 Consistent with
what it perceives as the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA, the Court has
liberalized the availability of arbitration by narrowly construing the grounds
under which arbitration agreements can be invalidated under the FAA’s
“savings clause”6 and by transferring an increasing array of gateway issues
to arbitrators.
The effect of the Court’s expansive interpretation of the FAA is
particularly felt in consumer and employment transactions. Claims arising
from these transactions often implicate statutory rights that afford vital
protections to consumers and employees. Additionally, the monetary value
of many of these claims is so small as to make individual prosecution
economically unfeasible. As a result, there is the question of whether these
claims, which implicate vital statutory rights, should be arbitrable, and if so,
whether there should be safeguards to ensure that arbitration is a fair arena
for resolving these disputes.
At the time the FAA was drafted, there were some indications that it
was intended to facilitate the arbitration of commercial disputes between
businesses.7 Arbitration was infrequently used outside the commercial
context during this period. In fact, some commentators felt that the FAA
was intended to have limited application with respect to employment
disputes8 and was not envisaged to apply to the resolution of consumer
disputes. As one commentator has noted, the “FAA was intended to
facilitate self-regulation within commercial communities, not to regulate
relationships between consumers and large corporations in arm’s length,
anonymous transactions.”9 Nonetheless, the Court has made it clear that the


to prohibit discrimination against arbitration agreements. See Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in
a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 39596 (2012).
5. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
6. Section 2 of the Act provides that an arbitration agreement may be invalidated “upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. §2.
7. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement
of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449,
466-67 (1996) (arguing that “[t]he unrebutted legislative history created prior to the FAA's passage
establishes that only disputes arising out of commercial contracts were to be arbitrable.”).
8.
See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Has Created
a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 100 (2006)
(arguing that the Court has interpreted the FAA “to cover worker agreements, which had been
expressly excluded by Congress.”).
9. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 942 (1999).
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Act applies to the arbitration of employment and consumer disputes, even
where these disputes implicate statutory rights.
On the issue of appropriate safeguards, the “savings clause” of the FAA
allows the invalidation of arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”10 To a large
extent, state courts have used the unconscionability doctrine for ensuring the
fairness of the arbitral process in these transactions. Recognizing that class
actions are sometimes the only effective means of prosecuting low-value
claims by consumers and employees, some state courts have used
unconscionability to regulate the enforceability of class action waivers in
arbitration agreements. However, the Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion11 severely limited the availability of this mechanism.
Concepcion held that the FAA precludes states from conditioning the
enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of class
proceedings. It held that this is the case even if “class proceedings are
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through
the legal system.”12
Post-Concepcion, the effective-vindication doctrine was the remaining
avenue open to prospective claimants for resisting the enforcement of
arbitration agreements that practically immunize defendants from liability
for violating federal statutory rights. Prospective claimants sought to avoid
the effect of the Court’s decision in Concepcion by arguing that class action
waivers should not be enforced where their enforcement would prevent a
party from vindicating his or her statutory rights.13
Amex has now narrowed the availability of the effective-vindication
doctrine as grounds for invalidating arbitration agreements. In Amex, the
Court reaffirmed its view that the FAA’s “command to enforce arbitration
agreement trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value
claims.”14 The Court limited effective-vindication challenges to situations


10. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
11. 131 S. Ct. at 1745.5.
12. Id. at 1753.
13. See Andrew J. Pincus & Archis A. Parasharami, Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to
Arbitration
Agreements,
Class
Defense
Blog,
(June
20,
2013),
http://www.classdefenseblog.com/2013/06/20/supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-arbitrationagreements//.
14. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5.
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where an arbitration agreement precludes the assertion of certain statutory
rights and cases where filing and administrative fees in arbitration “are so
high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”15 The Court interpreted
the doctrine as protecting only a notional “right to pursue” statutory claims,16
a right that is not implicated either by the prohibitive costs of “proving a
statutory remedy” or by the waiver of class action proceedings.
The practical consequence of the Court’s severely restrictive
interpretation of the doctrine is to make the doctrine less relevant in ensuring
access to justice. This effect will be particularly felt by consumers,
employees, and other small-value claimants. For these claimants, the
doctrine was one of a diminishing range of options for resisting the
enforcement of arbitration agreements that inhibit effective redress for
violations of statutory rights. Amex has narrowly delineated the nature and
extent of inquiry a court can make when considering an effective-vindication
challenge. By reducing the scope of the doctrine, the Court made it easier
for carefully drafted arbitration agreements to be used to deprive prospective
claimants of the opportunity to vindicate their statutory rights.
Amex is best understood in the broader context of the Court’s continuing
efforts to interpret statutes and regulations in a manner that essentially
insulates corporations from liability risks.17 Amex is one of several recent
decisions of the Court that consolidates this project. For example, the
decisions of the Court in its last session included one that put new
restrictions on lawsuits claiming on-the–-job harassment18 and another that
held that two million cable customers who filed an antitrust suit against
Comcast had not established a common method to determine monetary
damages.19 With these decisions, the Court continues a pattern of narrowing
“the avenues available to employees and consumers seeking to take their
grievance before a judge.”20 Furthermore, the Court continues to reduce the
grounds for challenging class action waivers affecting consumers,
employees, and other small-value claimants. Justice Kagan views Amex as
part of this latter trend. According to her, the majority focused narrowly on
the class action waiver instead of concentrating on the broader effect of the

15. Id. at 2310–11.
16. Id.
17. See Paul M. Barrett, The Supreme Court: Corporate America’s Employees of the Month,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, July 1, 2013, at 21, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-0627/the-supreme-court-corporate-americas-employees-of-the-month.
18. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
19. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
20. Barrett, supra note 17.17.
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entire arbitration agreement on the ability of the claimants to vindicate their
statutory rights, because “[t]o a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”21 In
her view, “to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23,22
everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.”23
The Court’s decision in Amex was informed by an expansive reading of
the scope of the FAA. The Court has interpreted the Act as embodying an
almost irrefutable preference for arbitration, even when this preference is at
odds with the realities of the difficulties of vindicating statutory rights. This
is even so when enforcement of an arbitration agreement would undermine
the realization of the policies enshrined in other federal statutes. In this
context, Amex intensifies the Court’s fetishizing of arbitration. Its sweeping
declaration that “[t]he FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements
trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims” would
have surprised even the most ardent advocates of the enactment of the Act.24
Amex affords an opportunity for the evaluation of the effective
vindication doctrine and an assessment of the potential import of the
decision on access to justice. This article explains how the doctrine serves
the important role of reconciling the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration
agreements with the need to ensure the vindication of statutory rights
embodied in federal command statues. It argues that the Court’s restrictive
interpretation of the doctrine in Amex would inhibit the redress of legitimate
statutory claims and suggests that a legislative response is required so that
arbitration continues to be an effective means of resolving disputes. Without
such a solution, the Court’s continuous weakening of challenges to the


21. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2320.
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
23. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2320.
24. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2320, n.5. Critiquing the Court’s
expansive interpretation of the scope of the FAA, Justice Stevens has observed that “[t]here is little
doubt that the Court’s interpretation of the [FAA] has given it a scope far beyond the expectations of
Congress in enacting it.” Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: the Forthcoming, Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 430 n.115. In a similar vein, Justice
O’Connor has noted that “[t]he Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent
with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.” Id. The
Court had adopted this broad interpretation of the FAA, often without taking into account the
substantive considerations of consent and the contractual context. See Amy J. Schmitz,
Considerations of ‘“Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration Provision, 81 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 123 (2007).
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fairness of the arbitral process would put the legitimacy of the process into
question.
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of judicial and legislative
attitude towards arbitration. In this part, I discuss how the FAA was
intended to reverse the traditional judicial hostility toward arbitration by
promoting the enforcement of arbitration agreements in commercial
transactions. I argue that the Court’s subsequent expansive interpretation of
the FAA is inconsistent with the policy considerations that informed the
enactment of the Act. The extreme pro arbitration posture adopted by the
Court is compelled neither by the context nor the text of the Act. In reading
the Act so expansively, the Court has significantly enlarged the scope of the
Act, practically eliminated the ability of states to regulate the availability of
arbitration agreements where necessary to protect the weak, and severely
limited the grounds for resisting enforcement of arbitration agreements. Part
II examines the development of the effective vindication doctrine. It situates
this discussion in the context of the Court’s approval of the arbitration of
statutory claims and the attendant need to reconcile the FAA’s policy
promoting the enforcement of arbitration agreements with the need to ensure
the vindication of rights embodied in other federal statutes. I discuss the
policy considerations informing the doctrine and examine how it has been
used to address the problems of expenses associated with arbitration,
structural bias in arbitration, and class action waivers. Part III evaluates both
the Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Amex. The discussion focuses
on the weaknesses in the arguments used by the majority to support its
narrow interpretation of the doctrine. I argue that the Court’s narrow
interpretation is at odds with the policy considerations underlying the
doctrine and cannot easily be reconciled with the Court’s prior teachings on
the role of the doctrine. Part IV explores the implication of the decisions,
particularly on the prosecution of small value claims and on the effective
vindication of rights embodied in state laws. Part V argues that a legislative
response has become necessary to assure the continued legitimacy of
arbitration as a fair and effective mechanism for resolving disputes.
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I.

TRACING THE EVOLUTION IN JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS
ARBITRATION

Although arbitration has existed in various forms over the centuries,25
there was an initial judicial hostility towards the process. This hostility was
explained in part by a fear that arbitration ousted the jurisdiction of the
courts and a suspicion that arbitrators may not be as vigilant in protecting the
interests of justice as judges are. The judicial suspicion of arbitration in the
common law tradition arose in England and spread to other common law
jurisdictions. In England, the court’s traditional cautious attitude towards
arbitration is reflected in Lord Coke’s dictum in the Vynior’s Case, where he
ordered the enforcement of an arbitration award but noted that a party may
countermand a predispute agreement to arbitrate.26 He compared predispute
arbitration agreements to revocable powers of attorney or revocable
provisions of a will. In his view, to bar the revocation of a predispute
arbitration agreement would be tantamount to making “not countermandable
[that] which is by law and of its own nature countermandable.”27 Under this
view, either party could renege on its promise to arbitrate if the promise was
made before an actual dispute arose between the contracting parties. The
consideration underlying this restrictive view of the enforceability of
arbitration agreements was made evident in Kill v. Hollister28, where the
court held that “the agreement of the parties [to arbitrate their dispute]
cannot oust [the jurisdiction of] this court.”29 Jealous of their jurisdictions
and afraid that arbitration was a means of whittling it down, courts used the
dictum in Kill as justification for refusing to enforce predispute arbitration
agreements.30 Ultimately, a contrary stream of authority, culminating in


25. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking The Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.. 637, 680 (1996).
26. Steven J. Burton in The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption,
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 474 (2006); see
also 8 Co. Rep. 80a.
27. Id. at 81b–82a.
28. 18 Geo. 2, 1 Wils 129.
29. Id.
30. See David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 1652 (2004).
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Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisher,31 did hold that predispute arbitration agreements
were enforceable.32
The judicial attitude in the United States towards arbitration took the
same trajectory as in England, initial suspicion and gradual, if grudging,
acceptance. The traditional judicial suspicion of arbitration was exemplified
in early New York decisions which viewed Coke’s dictum as an articulation
of a settled principle of English law and used it as justification for holding
predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable.33 However, with time,
judicial attitude towards arbitration became more relaxed and several states
enacted legislation permitting the enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements.34 This more relaxed attitude towards arbitration came to be
embodied in the FAA. Enacted in 1925, the Act was designed to promote
the enforcement of arbitration agreements by making them “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”35
The FAA has played an important role in the increasing use of
arbitration in resolving a broad range of disputes. The Court’s interpretation
of its scope, reach, and command has significantly affected access to justice
in the United States and constrained the ability of states to respond to access
and fairness issues in arbitrations. Amex illustrates how the Court’s
expansive interpretation of the FAA has led to the privileging of the proarbitration mandate of the Act over other competing public policy
considerations.
In its decision in Amex, the majority of the Supreme Court justified its
rejection of the applicability of the effective vindication defense by
reference to key insights it gleaned from the FAA. According to the Court,
the FAA “reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of


31. William Schofield, Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery: A Study in the Conflict of Laws,
9 HARV. L. REV. 371 (1896).
32. In fact, the English Arbitration Act of 1889 had provided a framework for a more
congenial judicial attitude towards arbitration. The Act made arbitration and submission agreements
irrevocable, provided for the finality of arbitral awards, and empowered arbitrators to summon
witnesses and examine them under oath.
33. For a review of these early New York cases, see Current Legislation, 25 COLUM. L. REV.
822 (1925).
34. Id. at 823 (citing legislation in New York, New Jersey, Oregon, and Massachusetts
providing for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate). The New York legislation, whose
enactment was spearheaded by Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer, is considered the first modern
state arbitration statute. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION—
NATIONALIZATION – INTERNALIZATION 28, 34–37 (1992).
35. 9 U.S.C. §2.
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contract” and requires courts to “‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements
according to their terms.”36 Unless Congress otherwise indicates, courts
must enforce arbitration agreements even where a violation of a federal
statute is alleged.37 The central purpose of the FAA “is the enforcement of
arbitration agreements on their terms.”38 To the Court, there is an overriding
interest in realizing this purpose with the result that “the FAA’s command to
enforce arbitration agreement trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution
of low-value claims.”39
It is remarkable that what began as a judicial suspicion of arbitration has
transformed into a judicial veneration of arbitration, a transformation that
has practical consequences for access to justice. This paper argues that while
the FAA compels a more favorable attitude towards arbitration, the Court’s
expansive reading of its reach and mandate would have surprised even the
most ardent proponents of the Act.40 The Court’s expansive interpretation of
the Act has been based largely on a contextual reading of the text. As a
result, the Court has not paid sufficient heed to the legislative history and
historical context of the legislation, both of which would suggest a more
restrained reading of the Act, not the expansive reading that now privileges
the pro-arbitration mandate of the Act above other competing public policy
considerations.41
The major proponents of the FAA had in mind a bill of limited scope.42
Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer, both of whom played major roles in


36. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309. See also § 2 of the FAA,
which provides that:
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
37. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309.
38. Id. at 2312 n.5.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Moses, supra note 88, at 99. (arguing that “a simple procedural statute enacted
to require enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal courts has become unrecognizable as the
law Congress adopted in 1925.”).
41. Id. at 111. Instead the Court has, as one commentator has aptly observed, “built a house of
cards that has almost no resemblance to the structure envisioned by the original statute.” Id. at 113.
42. Id. at 105.
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the enactment of the first New York Arbitration Law, were instrumental in
the passage of the FAA.43 The original FAA, which was modeled on the
New York statute, was drafted principally by Julius Cohen.44 The
testimonies by Cohen and Bernheimer during the Senate and
Subcommittees’ hearings for the bill illuminate the considerations that
motivated the passage of the bill. Of primary concern to them and others
who testified during the hearings was the need to move away from the
traditional judicial suspicion of arbitration towards a legislative and judicial
attitude that was more receptive to the arbitration of disputes between
merchants. They argued that businesses should be provided access to a
simple, expeditious, and cheap method of resolving disputes, in contrast to
the judicial system that was often congested, protracted, and expensive.45 In
a brief submitted to Congress, Cohen emphasized that arbitration served the
public interest as it provided a solution to some of the problems plaguing the
legal system.46
In a piece written shortly after the passage of the Act and substantially
based on his brief to Congress, Cohen emphasized three key features of
arbitration that informed the drafting process of the FAA: that arbitration
was founded on the free consent of the contracting parties;47 that arbitration


43. Id. at 102. Julius Cohen, a lawyer, was the general counsel of the New York State
Chamber of Commerce and Charles Bernheimer was the chair of the chamber’s arbitration
committee. Id.
44. Id. at 102.
45. Id. at 103. In his testimony during the hearings, Bernheimer noted that “[A]rbitration
saves time, … saves money . . preserves business friendships . . . raises business standards. It
maintains business honor, prevents unnecessary litigation, and eliminates the law’s delay in relieving
our courts.” Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before
the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7-8 (1924). [Hereinafter Joint Hearings].
46. See Joint Hearings, supra note 45, at 34–35.
47. Cohen noted that arbitration agreements are entirely voluntary and that the FAA “is
merely a new method for enforcing a contract freely made by the parties thereto.” Julius Henry
Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 279 (1926). It is
instructive to note that during his congressional testimony, he had suggested that the proposed act
would not apply to adhesion contracts, suggesting that aversion to such contracts was one of the
reasons for the traditional judicial suspicion of arbitration. According to him:
[T]he real fundamental cause was that at the time this rule was made people were not able
to take care of themselves in making contracts, and the stronger men would take
advantage of the weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them. And the courts
said, “If you let the people sign away their rights, the powerful will come in and take
away the rights of the weaker ones.” And that still is true to a certain extent.
Joint Hearings, supra note 455 at 15.
It was, therefore, envisaged that the Act would apply to genuinely consensual transaction, not
agreements offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees. See Prima
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was well suited for resolving disputes between merchants; and that
arbitration, even though useful in resolving business disputes, was “not the
proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involving
constitutional questions or policy in the application of statues.”48 He argued
that arbitration was mostly relevant to:
the disposition of the ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of fact –
quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of payment, excuse for nonperformance, and the like. It has a place also in the determination of the simpler questions
of law – the questions of law which arise out of these daily relations between merchants
49
as to the passage of title, the existence of warranties, or [similar] questions of law.

A then primary objective of the protagonists of the FAA was to
provide an effective private mechanism for merchants to resolve business
disputes. The drafters did not envisage the FAA as placing the interest in the
enforcement of arbitration agreements, even those that arise from adhesion
contracts, ahead of competing public interests enshrined in other statutes.
Their intent was more limited and they demonstrated a more nuanced
understanding of the limits of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes.
As one of those who testified during the congressional hearings noted, the
FAA was “purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of
sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if
they want to do it. Now that is all there is in this.”50 In fact, there were
indications that the Act was not intended to cover workers.51
It was probably because of the modest intent of its proponents that the
bill did not receive much opposition during the legislative process. It passed

Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 407, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing
Joint Hearings, supra note 45, at 9–11).
48. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 47, at 281.
49. Id.
50. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 40 (1923) [hereinafter Sales and Contracts] (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
He testified in his capacity as the chairman of the Committee of Trade and Commercial Law of the
American Bar Association. Id.
51. Sales and Contracts, supra note 50, at 9. After reviewing the legislative history of the Act,
Margret Moses noted that “the supporters of the legislation did not believe that it would apply to any
workers at all.” Moses, supra note 8, at 106. “Under the view of the Commerce Clause at that time,
the Act did not apply to contracts of most workers.” Id. “It only applied to contracts of workers
actually engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, such as seamen or railroad employees, and those
workers were specifically excluded.” Id.
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in both houses of Congress without a negative vote. The proposed bill
would probably have been subject to contentious debate and opposition had
those who voted for it foreseen what it would become several decades after
its passage.
Instructively, at the time the Act was passed, the use of arbitration was
largely confined to commercial transactions between merchants. There had
not yet been the proliferation of the use of arbitration in consumer
transactions. In fact, commentators originally considered the Act as
applying only to transactions involving interstate commerce.
Few
transactions between large businesses and consumers would have implicated
interstate commerce interests at the time the Act was passed.52
Consequently, some commentators believed that the FAA was not envisaged
to apply to such transactions.53
Alabama adopted this restrictive interpretation of the FAA. Alabama
courts routinely limited the application of the FAA to cases where the parties
to the transaction actively contemplated substantial interstate activity.54
However, in consonance with its expansive view of the scope of the FAA,
the Supreme Court subsequently rejected this narrow reading of the FAA,
holding that the Act applied to the full extent of the modern commerce
clause.55 In the same vein, it also held that the FAA applies broadly to
transactions affecting interstate commerce in the aggregate, even where the


52. Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act’s Interstate Commerce Requirement:
What’s Left for State Arbitration Law? 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 459 (1992).
53. Id. at 459. The author suggests that Congress may have felt that the regulation of
consumer disputes was outside the scope of its powers under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 460 n.34.
Accordingly, the phrase ‘”contracts evidencing a transaction involving commerce” [in § 2 of the
Act] was considered as implicating foreign or interstate commerce in a narrow sense and not in the
broad sense in which interstate commerce is understood contemporary constitutional doctrine. See
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruh, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of the
Federal Arbitration Law 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1430 (2008). The relevant portion of the Act
provides as follows: “A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable . . . ” Id. at 1426.
54. Bruh, supra note 53, at 1430. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So.2d
354, 355 (Ala. 1993); Thayer v. Am. Fin. Advisers, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599, 603-04 (Minn. 1982). For
other decisions adopting this approach, see Burke County Public Schools Bd. of Ed. v. Shaver
Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. 1981); R.J. Palmer Const. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co.,
642 P.2d 127 (Kan. 1982); Lacheney v. Profitkey Intern, Inc. 818 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Va. 1993).
There was, however, a contrary stream of authority that held that § 2 reached the limits of Congress’
power under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1984); Foster
v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1986).
55. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.,. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 268.
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particular transaction at issue may not have substantially affected interstate
commerce.56 This substantially affected the reach of the FAA.
Furthermore, most commentators initially believed that the Act was
intended by Congress to apply to disputes concerning the enforcement of
arbitration agreements in federal courts.57 As one commentator observed,
“[f]or years, courts and commentators agreed that the statute applied only in
the federal courts and so governed only the few contract suits that happened
to involve diversity or admiralty jurisdiction.”58 On this view, the Act would
have been inapplicable to most consumer transactions at the time it was
enacted.59 The Supreme Court subsequently rejected this view.60 According
to the Court, “[a]lthough the legislative history is not without ambiguities,
there are strong indications that Congress had in mind something more than
making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts.”61
This enlargement of the scope of application of the Act to state courts led to
its application to a broad range of consumer transactions handled by state
courts.
Even though the Court adopted an expansive interpretation of the scope
of the Act, its decisions on the mandate of the Act to enforce arbitration
agreements were measured and demonstrated an appreciation of the
historical context for the enactment of the statute. It was only with time that
it adopted the extreme pro-arbitration posture that has led it to severely limit
the avenues for challenging the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
This Court’s more nuanced approach to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements is exemplified by Wilko v. Swan.62 The Court had to decide the
arbitrability of a claim brought by a customer of a securities brokerage firm


56. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 55-57 (2003) (citing, Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942).
57. See, e.g., Strickland, supra note 52, at 391.
58. Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1315 (1985).
59. Sternlight, supra note 25, at 693. As Jean Sternlight has noted, “assuming for the moment
that the FAA was only intended to apply in federal court, and even assuming the parties were from
diverse states, few large merchant/small consumer transactions could have met the federal court
amount in controversy requirement in effect in 1924 of $3,000.” Id. at 712 n.44.
60. See Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), where the Supreme Court held, in a majority
decision, that the FAA applied in both federal and state courts.
61. Id. at 12.
62. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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who sought to recover damages under the Securities Act.63 The suit alleged
that as a result of “misrepresentations and omission of information” by the
brokerage firm, the customer bought stock that he subsequently sold for a
loss.64 When the brokerage firm moved to stay the action pending
arbitration, the District Court denied the request on the grounds that to
enforce the arbitration agreement would deprive the customer “of the
advantageous court remedy afforded by the Securities Act.”65 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals held that the Securities Act did not bar enforcement of
the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether the Act’s language prohibiting the purchaser of any security from
waiving any provision of the Act66 meant that agreements to arbitrate
disputes arising from the Act were unenforceable. The Court had to
reconcile the language of the Securities Act with that of § 2 of the FAA
making arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable and enforceable.”67
In denying the petition to stay the action, the Supreme Court held that
enforcement of the arbitration agreement would deny the plaintiff the
protection afforded him by the Securities Act, which prohibited “waiver of
judicial trial and review.”68 The Court’s decision was influenced by what it
perceived as the inferiority of the arbitration forum for the vindication of
statutory rights. Even though the arbitrators would apply the Securities Act,
the Court felt that it would be inappropriate to send the parties to arbitration.
This was because the “effectiveness in application” of the Securities Act
provisions would be “lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial
proceedings.”69 In the Court’s view, “the protective provisions of the
Securities Act require the exercise of judicial discretion to fairly assure their
effectiveness.”70 The Court was swayed by what it perceived as some of the
weaknesses of arbitration in this context: the fact that arbitrators are
“without judicial instruction in the law,” that arbitrators could render awards


63. 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77n.
64. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 428–29.
65. Id. at 430.
660 ) $#;>$))%'$+ ))956#-$# ) $#.() %*!) $#.$'%'$+ ( $# # #
#-%'($#&* ' ##-(*' )-)$, +$"%! #, )#-%'$+ ( $#$) ((*%)'
$'$)'*!(#'*!) $#($)$"" (( $#(!!+$ 09C0007;>0
67. Supra note 6.
68. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 437–38. In a subsequent decision, the Court refused to extend
this finding to the Securities Exchange Act. See Shearson/Am Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987).
69. Id. at 435.
70. Id. at 437.
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without explaining their reasons, and that there were limited grounds for
vacating arbitral awards.71 It is instructive to note that the Court
acknowledged that a similar arbitration clause would be enforceable in a
commercial contract.72 Nonetheless, it felt that Congress’s intent in the
Securities Act was better served by refusing to enforce arbitration
agreements against individuals.
Although Wilko dealt with a provision of the Securities Act specifically
prohibiting “waiver of judicial trial and review,”73 the Court’s decision is
nonetheless important in illustrating the Court’s initial nuanced attitude
towards the interpretation of the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration
agreements. In reaching its decision, the Court found it necessary to
consider the relative effectiveness of the arbitral forum in vindicating the
plaintiff’s statutory rights. Instead of merely relying on the Securities Act’s
prohibition of “waiver of judicial trial and review” as grounds for denying
the stay, it went further to assess the relative disadvantage of arbitration as a
forum for vindicating the protections afforded to the plaintiff by the
Securities Act.
Three years after Wilko, the Court reaffirmed its critique of arbitration.74
In deciding on the reach of the FAA,75 the Court noted that “[t]he change
from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in
ultimate results.”76 This was because in the Court’s view, “[a]rbitration
carries no right to trial by jury. . . . [a]rbirators do not have the benefit of
judicial instruction on the law . . . . need not give their reasons for their
results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court


71. Id. at 436. It should be noted that in a strong dissent, Justice Frankfurter, in a decision that
presages the future attitude of the court, stated that “[t]here is nothing in the record before us, nor in
the facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral system . . . would not
afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is entitled.” Id. at 439.
72. Id. at 438.
73. Id. at 437.
74. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
75. The Court held that the provision of § 3 of the United States Arbitration Act for stay of
the trial of an action until arbitration does not apply to all arbitration agreements, but only to those
covered by §§ 1 and 2 of the Act (specifically, those relating to maritime transactions and those
involving interstate or foreign commerce).
76. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of American, 350 U.S. at 203.
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trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial review of
a trial . . . “77
The point here is not that the Court’s critique of the arbitration process
in these cases was necessarily compelling,78 but that these cases illustrate a
period when the Court had a healthy skepticism for the use of arbitration and
felt the need, in deciding the reach of the FAA, to balance its pro-arbitration
mandate against competing policy considerations.
Some of the Court’s subsequent decisions on arbitration continued to
take into account the effectiveness of the arbitral forum in redressing the
rights of claimants, especially individuals. For example, in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,79 the Court balanced the public policy underlying Title
VII against the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes. In the
Court’s view, the balancing of the two interests was vital because the policy
against discrimination was of “the highest priority.”80 In allowing the
plaintiff who had arbitrated a claim under a collective bargaining agreement
to litigate a Title VII claim, the Court discussed the limitations of
vindicating statutory claims in arbitration proceedings. The Court’s
discussion of the limitations of arbitration is particularly striking in light of
its subsequent liberal attitude towards the arbitrability of public law claims
and its restrictive interpretation of what is required effectively to vindicate
statutory rights:
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make
arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created
by Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the special role of the arbitrator, whose task is
to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted
legislation. . . . But other facts may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior
to judicial processes in the protection of Title VII rights. Among these is the fact that the
specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the
law of the land. . . . Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge
and judgment concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations. On the other
hand, the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of
courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII,
whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law
concepts.


77. Id.
78. See W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 259, 334-54 (1990), for a critique of the use of public policy grounds for striking down
arbitration agreements.
79. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
80. Id. at 47.
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Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial
factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules
of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as
discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often
severely limited or unavailable. . . . And as this Court has recognized, “arbitrators have
no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award.” . . . Indeed, it is the
informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive,
and expeditious means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes
arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal
81
courts.

The court reached a similar result in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc.,82 where it held that arbitrating a claim under a
collective bargaining agreement did not preclude an individual from
bringing a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act.83 According to the Court,
an arbitrator whose duty is to effectuate the intent of the parties might issue
an award that is “inimical to the public policies underlying the FLSA, thus
depriving an employee of protected statutory rights.”84 Although the Court
subsequently narrowed its decision in Alexander and Barrentine,85 those
decisions are nonetheless relevant in illustrating a period in which the Court
adopted a more nuanced and cautious attitude in analyzing issues relating to
the scope and enforcement of arbitration agreements.
This more nuanced attitude towards arbitration was to transmute into an
unqualified preference for the enforcement of predispute mandatory
arbitration agreements. Part of the impetus for this change was the
recognition that arbitration was one of the vital solutions to the problem of
congested courts and the overburdened judicial system, a system that Chief
Justice Warren Burger, in 1976, characterized as in a “near crisis
situation.”86 Burger stressed the role of arbitration in addressing this
problem:

81. Id. at 56–58.
82. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
83. Id. at 745.
84. Id. at 729.
85. See Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
86. Addresses Delivered At the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79, 88 (1976) [hereinafter Addresses Delivered At the
National Conference] (statement of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger). The conference was named
“The Pound Conference.” See Hal Neth, The Federal Arbitration Act and How it Grew (May 2011)
(unpublished Master of Science thesis, University of Oregon), available at
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As the work of the courts increases, delays and costs will rise and the well-developed
forms of arbitration should have wider use. Lawyers, judges and social scientists of other
countries cannot understand our failure to make greater use of the arbitration process to
settle disputes. I submit a reappraisal of the values of the arbitration process is in order, to
determine whether, like the Administrative Procedure Act, arbitration can divert litigation
87
to other channels.

This call received broad support, including from a member of the
ABA’s Pound Conference Follow-up Task Force88 who argued that “[a]
substantial body of experience with compulsory arbitration procedure in
limited contexts suggests that broader application of this process – perhaps
to civil claims in broad categories and under certain jurisdictional amounts –
is warranted.”89 He stated that “[c]ompulsory arbitration has been effective
in disputes that involve specialized fields of law and a degree of expertise
not generally possessed by a judge in a court of general jurisdiction.”90
Further, he suggested that cases involving simple and routine issues may be
amenable to expedient resolution by arbitration.91 Along the same lines,
Attorney General Griffin Bell, who was the Chairman of the Pound
Conference Follow-up Task Force, suggested that “a carefully structured
arbitration system” would be beneficial “by providing faster and less
expensive resolution of some actions brought in the federal courts.”92
The shift in the Court’s attitude towards the interpretation of the
FAA began in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp.,93
where it first articulated the pro-arbitration policy that has since guided its
decisions.94 There the Court stated that “Section 2 is a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive law or procedural policies to the

http://adr.uoregon.edu/files/2012/01/federalarbitrationact.pdf.
Neth has suggested that the
conference and its aftermath “shed light on the powerful forces that may have shaped the Court’s
FAA jurisprudence.” Id.
87. Addresses Delivered At the National Conference, supra note 86, at 88. See also Neth,
supra note 86, at 24.
88. Colorado Supreme Court Justice William H. Erickson. See 64 A.B.A.J. 47 (1978).
89. Id. at 51.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 54.
93. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
94. Id. at 23. There was, however, earlier indication of judicial willingness to broaden the
scope of applicability of the FAA. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and
Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration
Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 773-75 (2004) (discussing the gradual growth of
FAA in this period during the 1960s and 1970s).
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contrary.”95 The Court did not discuss the contours or limits of this proarbitration policy, but this statement has been much cited as justification for
an expansive reading of the FAA.96
Moses H. Cone Memorial marked a shift in the Court’s attitude towards
arbitration and helped establish a liberal attitude towards the arbitrability of
disputes. According to the Court, “[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of abatable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself, or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or a like defense to arbitrability.”97
The shift in attitude intensified in Southland Corp. v. Keating,98 where
in a controversial decision, the Court held that § 2 of the FAA was a
substantive rule under the Commerce Clause, that the Act was binding on
states, and that it preempted state laws invalidating arbitration agreements.99
According to the Court, “[i]n enacting § 2 of the Federal Act, Congress
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”100
Moses H. Cone Memorial and Southland were crucial in establishing the
basic architecture of the modern attitude of the Court towards arbitration.
Moses H. Cone Memorial established, and Southland reinforced, the view
that with the FAA, Congress declared a liberal policy favoring arbitration.
Although neither case articulated the boundaries of this liberal policy,
subsequent decisions of the Court would use this “policy” as justification for


95. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24.
96. Id. Commentators have lamented the full import of the pro-arbitration policy articulated
by the court.. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997).
97. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25.
98. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
99. Id. Justice O’Connor, drawing on a careful reading of the legislative history of the Act,
strongly disagreed with the decision of the majority, noting that “Congress intended to require
federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements.” Id. at 24. In her view, the decision of the
majority was “unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary, and, in light of the FAA’s antecedents
… inexplicable.” Id. at 36. She concluded that “[a]lthough arbitration is a worthy alternative to
litigation, today’s exercise in judicial revisionism goes too far.” Id. at 36.
100. Id. at 10.
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severely limiting challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements
and empowering arbitrators to decide more “gateway” issues of arbitrability.
Additionally, Moses H. Cone Memorial stated, and Southland amplified, the
position that § 2 of the Act establishes a rule of substantive law that
preempted inconsistent state laws limiting the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. These decisions, and their progeny, have had the radical
consequence of expanding the reach of the FAA, while practically
eliminating the ability of states to regulate the availability of arbitration,
even where regulation is necessary to protect consumers or to enhance the
vindication of state statutory rights. Few of the proponents of the Act could
have foreseen the radical consequences it has had on access to justice in the
United States. As Justice Stevens aptly observed, “[t]here is little doubt that
the Court’s interpretation of the [FAA] has given it a scope far beyond the
expectations of the Congress that enacted it.”101
In the next section, we examine how the effective-vindication doctrine
emerged in the context of the Court’s enlargement of the arbitrability of
statutory claims and how the doctrine continued to evolve until the Amex
decision severely restricted its ambit.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EFFECTIVE-VINDICATION DOCTRINE
A. Mitsubishi and the Origin of the Doctrine
With the Court’s broadening of the scope of arbitrable matters and the
transfer of many gateway issues to arbitrators, it was only a matter of time
before the Court would reverse its view that arbitration was an inappropriate
forum for resolving federal statutory claims. The Court in Wilko first
cogently articulated its case against the arbitrability of federal statutory
claims..102 As indicated above, Wilko dealt with the arbitrability of a dispute
under the Securities Act, an Act that contained an anti-waiver provision.103
In that case, the Court expressed the view that “the intention of Congress
concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such
an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities] Act.”104
Lower courts read the decision broadly, with several of them relying on it to
support the denial of motions to compel arbitration of disputes under the


101. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001).
102. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
103. 9 U.S.C. § 14.
104. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
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Sherman Act.105 This was despite the fact that the Sherman Act, unlike the
Securities Act, does not contain an anti-waiver provision. For example, in
American Safety Equipment Corporation v. Maguire & Co.,106 the Second
Circuit relied on Wilko in reaching the conclusion that “the antitrust claims
raised [in the suit] were inappropriate for arbitration.”107 In reaching this
decision, the Court was swayed by the public interest embodied in the
Sherman Act to promote a competitive economy.108 As the Court began to
articulate the view that the FAA embodied a liberal pro-arbitration policy
and as it continued to transfer the decision of more gateway issues to
arbitrators, it became necessary for the Court to reconcile its emerging view
of congressional, liberal pro-arbitration intent under the FAA with its
reluctance to permit the arbitration of federal statutory rights.109
The Court was squarely faced with this issue in Mitsubishi.110 The Court
had to decide whether to enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust disputes
by arbitration in an international transaction.111 An allied issue before the
Court was whether the choice of a foreign governing law affected the
enforceability of such an agreement.112 The Court held that the parties’
arbitration agreement was broad enough to encompass the arbitration of
antitrust disputes, and found “no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying


105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
106. Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
107. Id. at 825. Overruled, by Rodriguez de Quinjas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S.
477 (1989).
108. According to the Court:
A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is
designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff
asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who
protects the public’s interest. Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of thousands–
perhaps millions–of people and inflict staggering economic damage.
Id. at 826.
109. As David Horton has noted, the reluctance to permit the enforcement of statutory claims
“created confusion about the relationship between the non-arbitrability rule that courts had created
and congressional intent” because “it was hard to square the reflexive non-arbitrability rule that
courts had created with the fact that the FAA’s text does not categorically exempt federal statutory
claims.” David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights
Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 732 (2012).
110. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614 (1985).
111. Id. at 624.
112. Id. at 637.
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in every contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory
claims.”113
In contrast to its earlier views, the Court stated that arbitration was not
an inferior forum for resolving claims relating to statutory rights. According
to the Court, a party who agrees to arbitrate a statutory claim “does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”114 In so doing, the
party “trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for
the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”115 Further, in the
Court’s opinion, neither the text nor the legislative history of the FAA
evinced a Congressional intent to preclude the waiver of the right to a
judicial forum.116 A party who contracts to arbitrate should be held to that
promise “unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”117
An important aspect of the Court’s decision in Mitsubishi was the
availability of the arbitral forum to vindicate the statutory claims in question.
Having found that there was “no reason to assume at the outset of the
dispute that international arbitration will not provide an adequate
mechanism” for resolving the statutory claim,118 the Court stated an
important caveat. It indicated that the FAA “will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function” only “so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory claim.”119 In this sense, arbitration is a
suitable forum for resolving claims involving statutory rights so long as the
arbitral process does not prevent a party from vindicating its federal
statutory rights. To buttress the importance of a claimant having the
opportunity to vindicate statutory claims, the Court noted that “in the event
the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies . . . we
would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public
policy.”120 By permitting the arbitration of the federal statutory claim while
introducing the important caveat that there is still an opportunity to vindicate


113. Id. at 625.
114. Id. at 628.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 636.
119. Id. at 637.
120. Id. at 637 n.19.
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statutory rights, the Court reconciled the pro-arbitration policy it found in
the FAA with the interest in ensuring the vindication of statutory rights.
The Court’s caution that the FAA would require the enforcement of an
arbitration agreement involving statutory claims so long as “the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory claim” marked the origin of
the effective-vindication doctrine. Although the Court’s statement was made
in the context of a discussion of the need for the arbitrators to apply
mandatory U.S. statutory law despite the party’s choice of a foreign
governing law, the principle it enunciated was not limited to the application
of mandatory rules. Further, there is little sound reason, as we shall see, for
so limiting the principle.
In fact, a review of the first sentence of the paragraph of the judgment
that deals with the effective-vindication issue121 indicates that the Court’s
primary concern was whether arbitration provided an “adequate mechanism”
for resolving the dispute involving a statutory claim. In the Court’s view,
arbitration was “an adequate mechanism” because it allowed the prospective
claimant the opportunity to vindicate its rights. Central to the Court’s finding
that the antitrust dispute was arbitrable was its statement that in agreeing to
arbitrate a dispute, a prospective litigant “does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by [a] statute.”122 As the Court stressed, the prospective
litigant merely “trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”123
Consequently, the prospective litigant does not bargain away the right to the
effective vindication of its statutory rights, but merely chooses what would
usually be a relatively simple, informal, and expeditious forum for
vindicating those claims. The principle in Mitsubishi then appears to be that
the FAA permits the arbitrability of federal statutory claims in so far as the
particular arbitration does not prevent a party from vindicating statutory
rights. Nonetheless, the ambit of the effective-vindication doctrine remained
unclear, even as subsequent decisions of the Court reaffirmed its importance.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.124 the Court compelled the
arbitration of a dispute alleging wrongful firing under the Age


121. Id. at 636.
122. Id. at 628
123. Id.
124. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),125 even though it
acknowledged that the ADEA furthered important social policies.126 The
Court held that the ADEA did not preclude the arbitration of claims arising
from the statute and rejected arguments about the unsuitability of arbitration
for resolving statutory disputes.127 In the Court’s view, there was no
inherent inconsistency in enforcing a predispute arbitration agreement and
advancing the vital social policies embodied in the ADEA:
We do not perceive any inherent inconsistency between those policies, however, and
enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. It is true that arbitration
focuses on specific disputes between the parties involved. The same can be said,
however, of judicial resolution of claims. Both of these dispute resolution mechanisms
nevertheless also can further broader social purposes. The Sherman Act, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed to advance
important public policies, but [we have held that] claims under those statutes are
appropriate for arbitration. “[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate
[his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to
128
serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”

Here again, the opportunity for the prospective litigant to effectively
vindicate its statutory claims was crucial to the Court’s holding that the
statutory claim was arbitrable. The social policies embodied in a federal
statue would not preclude the arbitrability of claims arising from the statute
in so far as the arbitral forum permitted the vindication of the statutory right.
The Court reaffirmed this approach in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V
Sky Reefer,129 a case involving a motion to stay judicial proceedings and to
compel arbitration in Tokyo under a clause in a bill of lading. The petitioner
resisted the motion on the grounds, inter alia, that the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA) stipulated that the terms of a contract of carriage could
not relieve a carrier from obligations or diminish the carrier’s legal duties


125. 29 U.S.C.S. § 621 et seq.
126. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 124 at 27.
127. Id. at 29–30. According to the Court, its recent decisions “have already rejected most of
these arguments as insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims.” It noted that the
“generalized attacks on arbitration rest on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the
protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,’ and as such, they are ‘far out
of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
disputes.’” Id. at 30.
128. Id. at 27–28, (citing Mitsubishi). The Court reaffirmed this approach in 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273–74 (2009), (holding that the arbitration of a claim under the ADEA
may not prevent a claimant “from effectively vindicating” their “federal statutory rights in the
arbitral forum.”)
129. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
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under the COGSA.130 The petitioner expressed fear that the arbitrators may
not apply the COGSA to the dispute.131 The Court held that the dispute was
arbitrable, and noted that compelling the parties to arbitrate did not relieve
the respondent from their obligations under the COGSA. Crucially, the
court reaffirmed that it would have had “little hesitation in condemning the
agreement as against public policy,” if it had been “persuaded that ‘the
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in -tandem as a
prospective waiver”’ of the petitioner’s statutory claims.”132
The Court was soon to be presented with the first opportunity to
consider the applicability of the effective-vindication doctrine where
arbitration expenses were alleged to prevent a party from vindicating its
claims in an arbitration proceeding. In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama
v. Randolph (Green Tree),133 the respondent had financed the purchase of a
home through the petitioner financial corporation. When the respondent
sued for violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),134 the petitioner
moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. The district court
granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
arbitration clause was unenforceable as the potential high costs of arbitration
failed to provide the minimum guarantees required to ensure that
respondents could vindicate their statutory rights.135 According to the Court
of Appeal, “forcing a plaintiff to bear the brunt of ‘hefty’ arbitration costs
and ‘steep filing fees’ constitutes ‘a legitimate basis for a conclusion that the
[arbitration] clause does not comport with [FAA’s] statutory policy.’”136 On


130. Section 3(8) provided as follows:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the
ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising from
negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section, or
lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void
and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. App. § 1303(8).
131. Vimar, supra note 129 at 540.
132. Id. at 540, (citing Mitsubishi).
133. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
134. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1601.
135. Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp. – Alabama, 178 F.3d 1149 (1999), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
136. Id. at 1157 (citing its decision in Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134
F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.1998)).
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appeal, the Court reversed, noting that the record before the court did not
contain sufficient information about the potential costs of arbitration to the
respondent. In the Court’s view, the risk that the prohibitive costs of
arbitration would prevent the respondent from vindicating her rights was too
speculative to justify invaliding the arbitration agreement.137 According to
the Court, “[i]t may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum. But the record does not show that
Randolph will bear such costs if she goes to arbitration.”138
Instructively, the Court noted that the burden was on the party resisting
the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the grounds that the
proceedings would be prohibitively expensive to demonstrate the likelihood
of incurring such costs.139 It was because the respondent did not discharge
this burden that the Court held that the Court of Appeals “erred in deciding
that the arbitration agreement’s silence with respect to costs and fees
rendered it unenforceable.”140
Green Tree represents an important phase in the evolution of the
effective-vindication doctrine because it marked the first time the Court
recognized the applicability of the doctrine to issues relating to the costs of
accessing the arbitral forum. While it acknowledged that the cost of access,
“large arbitration costs,” may preclude a party from effectively vindicating
its rights, the record in the instant case was insufficient to establish those
costs.
In light of the Court’s subsequent restrictive reading of the effectivevindication doctrine in American Express,141 it is noteworthy that in its
decision in Green Tree the Court had no hesitation in accepting that the
doctrine would be applicable where the costs associated with arbitrating a
statutory claim prevent a party from vindicating statutory rights. Green Tree
could have interpreted Mitsubishi narrowly as concerned solely with the
willingness and ability of arbitrators to apply the full strength of mandatory
statutory law. However, by broadly interpreting the principle enunciated by
Mitsubishi to include access issues, the Court implicitly recognized that the
policy considerations underlying the effective-vindication doctrine ranged


137. Green Tree, supra note 133 at 91.
138. Id. at 90.
139. Id. at 92.
140. Id.
141. Discussed in Part III(b), infra.
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farther than the interest in ensuring that arbitrators enforce mandatory laws.
It is to these policy considerations that we now turn.
B. Policy Considerations Informing the Doctrine
At a fundamental level, the effective-vindication doctrine represents an
attempt to balance the pro-arbitration policy embodied in the FAA with the
public interest in vindicating the statutory rights granted by other federal
statutes. While the FAA reflects a policy of enforcing arbitration
agreements as other contractual obligations,142 that policy often comes into
conflict with the need to enforce statutory rights in cases where compelling
the parties to arbitrate in a private forum may inhibit the vindication of their
federal statutory rights. In Mitsubishi, the Court recognized that the proarbitration policy of the FAA does not trump the public interest in
vindicating these statutory rights.143
It would be recalled that the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA was
informed by the recognition that the bases for the traditional judicial hostility
to arbitration were no longer justifiable. Of particular importance in
dissolving this attitude of hostility was the recognition of the benefits of
arbitration both in providing a flexible and often expeditious forum for
resolving private disputes and in decongesting the courts.144 With time, a
more congenial judicial attitude emerged that respected the autonomy of
parties to elect to resolve an increasing array of disputes by private
arbitration. As the Supreme Court broadened its conception of the mandate
of the FAA, courts began to interpret the Act as permitting the arbitration of
an increasing array of statutory claims. This broadening of the scope of
arbitrable publiclaw claims necessitated the articulation of a limiting
principle to ensure that the statutory rights of claimants are appropriately
vindicated in the arbitral forum. The effective-vindication doctrine has
served as this limiting principle.
In allowing the arbitration of federal statutory claims, the courts
necessarily assume that arbitration adequately protects claimants’ ability to

142. See Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2309.
143. See text accompanying note 119, supra.
144. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 at 628 (noting that parties choose to arbitrate their disputes
principally to “trade[] . . . the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration”).
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resolve their statutory claims. 145 In fact, in finding that statutory claims are
arbitrable unless Congress otherwise indicates, courts have frequently
expressed the assumption that these claims are as vindicable in arbitral
forums as they are in judicial ones.146 However, this assumption of the
appropriateness of arbitration for resolving statutory claims “falls apart . . . if
the terms of an arbitration agreement actually prevent an individual from
effectively vindicating his or her statutory rights.”147 Consequently, the
effective-vindication doctrine operates as a necessary support for the
receptiveness of arbitration as a suitable forum for resolving statutory
claims. The doctrine does this by compelling the refusal to enforce an
arbitration agreement where costs or terms of the arbitration agreement
“would render arbitration an inaccessible or inadequate forum for the
adjudication of federal right.”148
In addition, the effective-vindication doctrine is vital in securing the
deterrence function of federal command statutes.149 Deterrence is often an
important goal of command statutes. Central to “most command statutes is a
deterrence goal. Congress wishes to stop particular conduct either because
the conduct itself directly causes harm, or because secondary consequences
of the conduct cause harm.”150 Most federal statutory claims are based on
statues that have important deterrence goals.151 This deterrence function of
command statutes is relevant not just to the particular claimant before the


145. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that
“[t]he arbitration of statutory claims must be accessible to potential litigants as well as adequate to
protect the rights in question so that arbitration, like the judicial resolution of disputes, will ‘further
broader social purposes’”).
146. See, e.g., text accompanying note 128, supra.
147. Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999).
148. Brief of Amicus Curiae New England Legal Foundation’s in Support of Petitioners, at 8.
In a similar vein, the court in Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., noted that the arbitrability of
federal statutory claims “rest on the assumption that the arbitration clause permits relief equivalent to
court remedies” and that an agreement would not be enforceable if its provisions defeat the remedial
purposes of the applicable federal statute. 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998).
149. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 at 637 (noting that "so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue
to serve both its remedial and deterrent functions.").
150. Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling Private Rights of Action,
34 VILL. L. REV. 429, 456 (1989).
151. See Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases,
40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 275, 278-84 (2002) (arguing that the fundamental purpose of U.S.
antitrust law, as interpreted by courts, is deterrence).
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court but also to society generally.152 As a result, the treatment of federal
statutory claims raises more complex issues than do those involving ordinary
contractual transactions.153 Unlike in the latter case which implicates private
interests only, the former requires a careful balancing of the policy by
favoring the enforcement of private obligations with the vital policy of
realizing the goals of federal command statutes. Again, the effectivevindication doctrine affords a means of balancing these competing policy
considerations.
Furthermore, the effective-vindication doctrine facilitates the realization
of congressional intent in enacting the FAA. In enacting the FAA, Congress
intended to enable private parties to resolve their disputes in a private,
informal, flexible, yet effective forum.154 The FAA was aimed at promoting
the efficient resolution, not elimination, of claims in a private system of
dispute resolution. The doctrine furthers this purpose of the Act “by
encouraging agreements that will actually result in parties ‘resolving
disputes’ in arbitration” and by providing “parties an incentive to negotiate
agreements that allow for arbitration of federal statutory claims, as opposed
to agreements that foreclose parties’ ability to vindicate federal rights in
arbitration.”155 Justice Kagan amplified this point in her dissent in American
Express:
“[T]he effective-vindication rule furthers the purposes not just of laws like the Sherman
Act, but of the FAA itself. That statute reflects a federal policy favoring actual arbitration
– that is arbitration as a streamlined ‘method of resolving disputes,’ not as a foolproof
way of killing off valid claims. Put otherwise: What the FAA prefers to litigation is
arbitration, not de facto immunity. The effective vindication-rule furthers the statute’s


152. Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547,
591 (2005).
153. See Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1983, 1995 (2002) (noting that “[t]he treatment of statutory rights is different because of the
public interest in the resolution of disputes over statutory rights–an interest that is separate from
private parties’ interest in resolving a dispute between themselves.”).
154. See Mastrobuono v. Sherson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) (noting that
“parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreement as they see fit.”); Hall Street
Assoc., LLC. V. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (noting that the FAA enables parties to
“tailor. . . many features of arbitration by contract, including the way arbitrators are chosen, what
their qualifications should be, which issues are arbitrable, along with procedure and choice of
substantive law.”).
155. Respondent’s Brief at 41.
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goals by ensuring that arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of dispute resolution.
156
“

In this sense, the doctrine fosters the use of arbitration as an effective
method of resolving disputes.157 The limitation that the doctrine places on
the arbitrability of federal statutory claims has contributed to the evolution
of more “consumer –friendly” clauses in arbitration agreements, designed to
reduce some of the problems of access in arbitrations.158 These clauses
enhance access to arbitration through the use of mechanisms like fee–
shifting, cost–shifting, and cost–sharing arrangements.
Against the background of the foregoing policy considerations
informing the doctrine, we shall now briefly examine how courts applied the
doctrine in different contexts. The discussion focuses on its application in
three important respects: its application to expenses associated with
arbitration, its application to structural bias in arbitration, and its application
to class action waivers. This discussion provides a useful context for
understanding the radical nature of the Court’s decision in American Express
and for exploring the broader consequences of the case on the evolution of
American arbitration law.

C. Judicial Refinement of the Doctrine
1. Expenses Associated with Arbitration
Expenses associated with arbitration affect the ability of a claimant to
use arbitration as a method of resolving disputes. These expenses include
those obtainable in litigation, such as attorneys’ fees, and those peculiar to
arbitration, such as arbitrators and administrative fees. Of particular concern
with respect to the vindication of statutory rights is whether the fees and
expenses peculiar to the system of arbitration chosen by the parties preclude
the prospective claimant from vindicating his or her statutory rights in the
arbitral forum. Important in this regard are not just the expenses associated

156. Amex, 133 S. Ct. 2304 at 2315.
157. Id. (Kagan notes that the doctrine encourages companies “to adopt arbitral procedures that
facilitate efficient and accurate handling of complaints.”)
158. See Myriam Gilles, Killing Them With Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 829 (2012)
(arguing that the doctrine the doctrine has encouraged businesses to implement “bilateral arbitration
agreements that appear designed to give judges comfort that the claimant will be able to vindicate its
rights, thereby enabling courts to enforce those agreements…”).
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with arbitration, but also how those expenses are allocated between the
parties. For example, clauses such as cost-splitting159 and loser–pays
clauses160 may make it relatively more expensive for a prospective claimant
to arbitrate a statutory dispute than to litigate it. The cost-differential
between arbitration and litigation may be so wide and the financial burden of
arbitration so heavy as to preclude a prospective claimant from vindicating
her claim in an arbitral forum. Courts have struggled with how to determine
when the relative costs of arbitration as compared to litigation would justify
refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement under the effective-vindication
doctrine.
Prior to the Court’s decision in Green Tree,161 some courts adopted a per
se approach in analyzing the effect of some cost provisions of arbitration
agreements on the ability of prospective claimants to vindicate their
statutory rights. In Cole v. Burns,162 for example, the D.C. Circuit applied a
per se rule in analyzing a fee –splitting agreement.163 The court reasoned that
a party should not be required to pay the fees of an arbitrator as a condition
for bringing a statutory claim under Title VII, especially in light of the fact
that a party “would never be required to pay for a judge in court.”164
According to the court, in permitting the arbitration of federal statutory
claims, the Gilmer Court assumed that arbitration would be a reasonable
substitute for litigation;165 an assumption that would be undermined where a
claimant is saddled with the burden of paying arbitrators’ fees, a burden that
is nonexistent in the litigation context. Additionally, the court argued that
requiring a claimant to share in the cost of the arbitrators’ fees would deter
prospective claimants from bringing claims to enforce their statutory
rights.166 The court concluded that a claimant “could not be required to
arbitrate his public law claim . . . if the arbitration agreement required him to


159. Cost-splitting clauses require the parties to share the cost of the arbitration proceedings.
160. In contrast to cost-splitting agreements, loser-pays clauses require the losing party to pay
the cost of the arbitration proceedings.
161. Green Tree, supra note 133.
162. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
163. The court interpreted the arbitration clause in issue as not requiring the claimant to pay
any arbitration fees and held that the clause, as interpreted, was enforceable.
164. Id. at 1468, 1484.
165. Gilmer, supra note 124.
166. Cole, supra note 162, at 1468.
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pay all or part of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses.”167 In Paladino v. Avnet
Computer Techs., Inc.,168 the Eleventh Circuit, citing Cole, stated that
requiring a claimant to pay part of the hefty cost of arbitration was “a
legitimate basis for a conclusion that the clause does not comport with
statutory policy.”169
The approach in Cole was arguably inconsistent with the language and
spirit of both Mitsubishi and Gilmer in that it shifted the focus from an
evaluation of the effect of the arbitration agreement on the vindication of
federal statutory rights to an evaluation of the equivalence between the costs
of arbitration and litigation. The Supreme Court decisions called for the
refusal to enforce only those arbitration agreements that have the practical
effect of preventing prospective claimants from vindicating their statutory
claims. This required not merely a tabulation of the relative costs of both
processes, but an examination of whether the cost and other differentials
between the two processes practically inhibited the vindication of federal
statutory claims.
In its decision in Green Tree,170 the Court shed some light on the nature
of the analysis required in effective-vindication cases. Green Tree
recognized that “large arbitration costs” may prevent a party from
vindicating her statutory claims.171 However, it placed the burden on the
claimant to establish that the costs of arbitration would be prohibitively
expensive.172 The Court implicitly disapproved the per se approach. In
rejecting the claimant’s effective-vindication defense, the Court focused on
the claimant’s inability to show that she was likely to incur prohibitive
costs.173 In the Court’s view, the mere “risk” that the claimant would be
“saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation
of an arbitration agreement.”174 After Green Tree, lower courts had to
rethink their approach towards analyzing the effects of arbitration expenses
on the enforceability of arbitration agreements.175 Although Green Tree


167. Id. at 1485.
168. Paladino, supra note 136.
169. Id. at 1062.
170. Green Tree, supra note 133.
171. Id. at 90.
172. Id. at 91.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. However, even subsequent to Green Tree, one circuit has held that fee – splitting
agreements are per se unenforceable. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.
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marked a movement away from the per se approach, there remained the
issue whether courts should focus on the effect of arbitration costs on the
particular claimant or whether the focus should also include the deterrence
effect of arbitration costs on a class of prospective claimants. Two divergent
approaches emerged in the circuits.
In Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems,176 the Fourth Circuit
established an individualized approach that a majority of the circuits
follow.177 In Bradford, the claimant argued that the fee–splitting provisions
in an arbitration agreement rendered the agreement unenforceable as a
matter of law because, in his view, requiring claimants to pay all or part of
arbitration costs would deter them from enforcing their statutory rights. He
suggested that this would undermine the remedial and deterrent purposes of
the federal statute.178 The claimant encouraged the court to adopt a per se
rule that would make unenforceable all arbitration agreements with fee–
splitting provisions “irrespective of actual individual deterrence, based upon
the overall deterrent effect of such provisions.”179
The court rejected the per se approach. Although it acknowledged that
fee–splitting provisions of an arbitration agreement would make the
agreement unenforceable if they impose arbitration fees and costs that are so
prohibitive as to effectively deny a claimant access to the arbitral forum,180
the court felt that Green Tree compelled a case–by–case analysis of the
effect of such provisions.181 In the court’s view, the refusal by the Court in
Green Tree to accept “the speculative risk that a claimant might incur
prohibitive costs [as grounds for invaliding an arbitration agreement]


2002). The court, however, did not cite Green Tree in conducting its effective-vindication analysis.
Id. at 895.
176. 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
177. See, e.g., Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 711-12 (5th Cir. 2002);
Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003); Musnick v. King Motor Co. of
Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003).
178. Bradford, supra note 176 at 552. He had alleged his employer had acted in violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 621.
179. Id. In the alternative, the claimant argued that, if the court rejected the per se rule, he had
personally established sufficient personal hardship and financial deterrence for the court to refuse to
enforce the arbitration agreement. Id.
180. Id. at 554.
181. Id. at 557.
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undermined the rationale” of the per se approach.182 Green Tree required the
focus to be on the effect of the arbitration agreement on “the individual
litigant” in contrast to the “per se rule that would nullify or invalidate an
entire category of arbitration provisions.”183 The central focus, in the court’s
view, should be on “the particular claimant:” whether she has an adequate
and effective arbitral forum for vindicating her statutory rights.184 The court
explained the nature of the required analysis as follows:
We believe the appropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a
particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case
analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant’s ability to pay the
arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation
in court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of
185
claims.

In finding that arbitration was an appropriate forum for resolving federal
statutory claims, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of a
claimant’s ability to vindicate his or her statutory rights in the arbitral forum.
This ability was necessary in order for applicable federal statutes to “serve
both [their] remedial and deferent function.”186 Ensuring that a particular
claimant is able to vindicate her rights in an arbitral forum by not being
precluded from bringing a claim by the exorbitant cost of arbitration will
help in realizing the remedial function of the applicable federal statute.
However, focusing exclusively on the ability of individual claimants to
vindicate their individual claims in the arbitral forum would not necessarily
promote the realization of the deterrent function of applicable federal
statutes. The provisions of an arbitration agreement may well have the
capacity of deterring a class of prospective claimants from vindicating
statutory claims without necessarily having that effect in the individual case
before a court. For example, the particular claimant may be better resourced
than the typical claimant. Consequently, a court may concentrate on the
effect of the arbitration agreement on the claimant before it may decide to
enforce an arbitration agreement, even though the agreement has the broader
effect of discouraging other prospective claimants from prosecuting their
claims.


182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 556.
185. Id.
186. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 at 28.
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The case-by-case approach advocated by Bradford may lead to the
undermining of the deterrence function of the federal statutes. This approach
focuses the effective-vindication analysis almost entirely on the ability of
arbitration to serve the remedial function of federal statutes by not deterring
the particular claimant before the court, but pays scant attention to the
deterrence effect of arbitration agreements on prospective claimants that are
not before the court. Although the third prong of the Bradford test asks
“whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of
claims,”187 the actual analysis conducted by the court focused on the
deterrent effect of the fee-–splitting provision on the claimant before it.188
The individualized approach suffers the weakness of ignoring the
potential “chilling effect” of certain arbitration agreements in deterring
prospective claimants from vindicating their statutory rights.189 As another
court has noted, the key “issue is not only whether an individual claimant
would be precluded from effectively vindicating his or her rights in an
arbitral forum by the risk of incurring substantial costs, but also whether
other similarly situated individuals would be deterred by those risks as
well.”190
Another problem with the individualized, case-by-case approach
adopted by Bradford, and one which has led to the reduced viability of
effective-vindication challenges, is that it requires claimants to prove their
personal inability to afford the expense of arbitration. This invariably
necessitates claimants submitting information about their personal finances
and the projected costs of the arbitration proceedings, a requirement that has
had the practical consequence of making it exceedingly difficult for
claimants to prevail in effective-vindication inquiries.
In Green Tree, the Court made it clear that the mere “risk” that one
would be “saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the
invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”191 Although the Court did not


187. Bradford, supra note 176 at 556.
188. Id. 558 (noting that “Bradford has failed to demonstrate any inability to pay the arbitration
fees and cost . . . to support his assertion that the fee-splitting provision deterred him from arbitrating
his statutory claims.”).
189. Morison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 661 (6th Cir. 2003), discussed infra at text
accompanying note 197.
190. Morison, supra note 188, at 661.
191. Green Tree, supra note 133, at 91.
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decide how “detailed the showing of prohibitive expense must be,”192 it was
adamant that the expenses cannot be merely “speculative.”193 Bradford’s
three-prong test, when read together with Green Tree’s command that
projected expenses be more than speculative, makes it an almost
insurmountable task to establish cost-based effective-vindication challenges.
First, it is often difficult for claimants to prove, during the prearbitration phase when the court usually entertained these challenges, the
projected cost of arbitration with the precision required by Green Tree and
Bradford. The structure of the arbitration agreement may make this
projection inherently imprecise, as in cases where the arbitration agreement
“allows for different arbitration providers, contain[s] ambiguous language as
to how many arbitrators would hear the case, and contains ambiguity
involving the possibility of shifting of attorney’s fees.”194 In such cases, the
claimant may have failed to establish the effective-vindication defense even
though she potentially faces a huge cost burden. Second, where claimants
can only establish a range of possible costs of arbitration because of the
difficulty of tabulating exact figures during the pre-arbitration phase of the
hearing, courts often utilize the lower range in finding that the claimant has
not established the effective-vindication defense. For example, in Boyd v.
Town Hayneville,195 the court rejected the defense on the grounds that the
projected costs were merely “anticipated,” even though the plaintiff had
shown that the arbitration would cost between $1150 and $6400 and the
plaintiff and his wife had only about $100 remaining each month after
meeting their living expenses.
The Bradford approach compounds the difficulty that prospective
claimants face in establishing the baseline of arbitration costs against which
litigations costs can be compared. If great likelihood of high cost is
insufficient to sustain a challenge, prospective claimants, “specifically those
with limited means, are unlikely to gamble their food or housing money on
the chance of a substantial arbitration award.”196 The result is that such
prospective claimants will be deterred from vindicating their statutory claim,
thereby undermining the deterrent effect of the relevant federal statutes.

192. Id. at 92.
193. Id. at 91.
194. Richard A. Bales & Mark B. Gerano, Determining the Proper Standard for Invalidating
Arbitration Agreements Based on High Prohibitive Costs: A Discussion of the Varying Applications
of the Case-by-Case Rule, 14 TRANSACTIONS 57, 66 (2012).
195. 144 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
196. Jennifer L. Peresie, Reducing the Presumption of Arbitrability, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
453, 460 (2004).
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Morrison v. Circuit City Stores,197 a decision by the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, has advanced an alternative, more liberal approach in
determining whether arbitration agreements operate to prevent the
vindication of federal statutory rights. The Morrison approach broadens the
focus of effective-vindication analysis from the deterrent effect of arbitration
provisions on the individual claimant before the court to its effects on a class
of similarly situated prospective claimants.198 This liberal approach factors
into the analysis how the arbitration provisions affect the realization of both
the remedial function199 and the deterrence function200 of federal statutes.
The plaintiff in Morrison, Lillian Morrison, had signed an arbitration
agreement requiring the arbitration of all disputes arising from her
employment with Circuit City, including all state and federal statutory
claims.201 The arbitration agreement contained a cost-splitting clause under
which Morrison was to pay a filing fee as well as half of the costs of the
arbitration, unless the arbitration tribunal decided otherwise.202 When
Circuit City terminated her employment, she filed a suit alleging race and
sex discrimination.203 The district court granted Circuit City’s motion to
compel arbitration.204 On appeal, Morrison argued that the cost-splitting
provision of the arbitration agreement prevented her from effectively
vindicating her statutory rights.205
In its decision, the Sixth Circuit discussed the implication of both
Gilmer and Green Tree on the conduct of effective-vindication analysis.
The court felt that by requiring that the arbitral forum is accessible to
prospective litigants in order “further broader social purposes,” Gilmer


197. Morrison, supra note 188.
198. This approach has also been adopted by the Third Circuit. See Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l,
324 F.3d 212 (3rd Cir. 2003).
199. It requires an examination of the issue whether the provisions have the cumulative effect
of preventing the potential claimant from vindicating her rights.
200. It requires an examination of the “chilling effect” of the arbitration provisions on a class
of similarly situated prospective claimants.
201. Morrison, 317 supra note 188 at 654.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 828-29 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
205. Morrison, supra note 188, at 657–58. It is instructive to note that because the district
court’s order to compel arbitration was not stayed when she filed her appeal, the arbitrators had
already issued their award before the Court of Appeals issued its judgment. Id. at 656.
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entailed that “employers should not be permitted to draft arbitration
agreements that deter a substantial number of potential litigants from”
vindicating their statutory rights.206 Although the court acknowledged that
Green Tree required a case-by-case approach in conducting effectivevindication analysis,207 it rejected the individualized case-by-case approach
adopted in Bradford. It gave two compelling reasons why the Bradford
approach was inadvisable: the difficulty of establishing baseline arbitration
costs in the manner required under the Bradford test and the fact that the
individualized approach does not factor in the “chilling effect” some
arbitration agreements have in “deterring a substantial number of potential
litigants from seeking to vindicate their statutory rights.”208 In place of the
individualized approach, the court adopted what it called a “revised case-bycase approach.”209 Under this approach, a court conducting an effectivevindication analysis would consider whether the arbitration provisions have
the effect of preventing the prospective claimant before the court and other
similarly situated individuals from vindicating their statutory rights.210
The Morrison approach is more liberal than the Bradford approach for a
variety of reasons. It enlarges the focus of the effective-vindicating analysis
by factoring in the potential “chilling effect” of the arbitration provisions on
similarly situated parties. This enlargement of focus is informed by the need
to advance both the remedial and the deterrent functions of federal command
statutes.211 The former function is realized by enabling a particular claimant
to vindicate his or her statutory rights. The latter function, which implicates
“broader social functions,” is advanced by ensuring that the subjects of
statutory obligations do not evade those obligations by immunizing
themselves from liability through the use of carefully worded arbitration


206. Id. at 658. It added that allowing employers to deter a substantial number of potential
litigants would undermine the social goals of the federal statutes and enable employers to evade the
requirements of those statutes. Id.
207. Id. at 659.
208. Id. at 660–61.
209. Id. at 663.
210. Id. According to the court, potential litigants should be allowed “to demonstrate that the
potential costs of arbitration are great enough to deter them and similarly situated individuals from
seeking to vindicate their federal rights in the arbitral forum.” (emphasis added) Id. The court’s use
of the conjunctive is unfortunate, because while the realization of the deterrence function of federal
statutes may require a focus on the effect of arbitration provisions on similarly situated prospective
claimants, the realization of the remedial function of these statutes would require a successful
effective-vindication challenge where the provisions of the arbitration agreement in question has the
effect of deterring the particular claimant from vindicating his or her statutory rights.
211. Id. at 663.

>;<

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss3/4

38

Chukwumerije: The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication Doctrine i

5$!0;>/=A?.<:;>6


       

agreements that practically preclude access to the arbitral forum. In the
court’s view, it is the “presence [of potential litigants] in the system and
their ability to vindicate their statutory rights that would help realize the
deterrent function of federal statutory rights.”212
Furthermore, the Morrison approach adopts a more relaxed approach in
establishing baseline arbitration costs. Unlike the Bradford approach, under
which individual claimants have the burden of establishing their potential
arbitration costs with a high degree of definiteness, the Morrison approach
allows the court to “look to average or typical arbitration costs, because that
is the kind of information that potential litigants will take into account in
deciding whether to bring their claims in the arbitral forum.”213
Additionally, in determining the baseline costs of arbitration, the Morrison
approach does not factor in the possible effect of cost-shifting provisions in
eventually reducing the expenses of the claimant.214 Because the Morrison
effective-vindication analysis focuses on the effect of the arbitration
agreement on similarly situated claimants, the possibility that the operation
of the cost-shifting clause may reduce expenses of an individual claimant is
less relevant. After all, the arbitration agreement may still have the overall
effect of deterring similarly situated claimants from vindicating their
legitimate statutory grievances despite having that practical consequence of
reducing the expenses of a particular claimant in the particular instance.215
Although the Morrison approach is consistent with the goal of realizing
the remedial and deterrence function of federal statutes, there remains some
tension between this approach and the tenor of Court’s decision in Green
Tree.216 In Green Tree, the Court focused on whether the costs of arbitration
“could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”217 The Court felt that she had failed to
establish the effective-vindication defense because “the record [did not]


212. Id.
213. Id. at 664.
214. Id. at 664–65.
215. Id. The court observed that “[i]n many cases, if not most, employees considering the
consequences of bringing their claims in the arbitral forum will be inclined to err on the side of
caution, especially when the worst-case scenario would mean not only losing on their substantive
claims but also the imposition of the costs of arbitration.” Id.
216. Green Tree, supra note 161.
217. Id. at 522.
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show that Randolph will bear [large arbitration] costs if she goes to
arbitration.”218 The Court concluded that a party raising the effectivevindication challenge bears the burden of establishing the likelihood of
incurring large arbitration costs.219 The Court’s language strongly suggests
that the case-by-case analysis should focus on the effect of arbitration
provision on individual claimants, as the Bradford approach requires.
However, narrowing the focus of the analysis in the manner suggested by
Bradford undermines one of the foundational bases for the Court’s finding
that federal statutory claims were arbitrable: the assumption that the arbitral
forum, similar to the judicial forum, would advance the realization of the
dual functions of federal command statutes.220
In Gilmer, the Court shed some light on the considerations that support
the arbitration of federal statutory claims:
[T]he ADEA is designed not only to address individual grievances, but also to further
important social policies. We do not perceive any inherent inconsistency between those
policies, however, and enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. It is
true that arbitration focuses on specific disputes between the parties involved. The same
can be said, however, of judicial resolution of claims. Both of these dispute resolution
mechanisms nevertheless also can further broader social purposes. The Sherman Act, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed
to advance important public policies, but . . . claims under those statutes are appropriate
for arbitration. “[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
221
remedial and deterrent function.”

Here the court recognizes that federal statutory claims advance
“important public policies” separate from the “individual grievances” of
particular claimants. Nonetheless, the court finds that these claims are
arbitrable, and that the statute will continue to perform its dual functions, so
long as claimants are able to vindicate their rights. However, individualized
effective-vindication analysis, advocated by Bradford, would advance
redressing of “individual grievances” without necessarily furthering the
realization of the “important social goals” that the Gilmer Court recognized
are embodied in federal statutes. If arbitration frustrates the realization of
these “important social goals,” it cannot be said to “further broader social


218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Mitsubishi, 473 U. S. at 637 (noting that federal statutes would continue to perform
their remedial and deterrent function “so long as the prospective litigant may vindicate its statutory
rights”).
221. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28 [internal citations omitted].
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purposes” in the sense envisaged by the Gilmer Court and used by it in
support of allowing the arbitration of federal statutory claims. It would seem
that the Morrison approach to effective-vindication inquiry accords better
both with the policy justifications used by the Courts for allowing the
arbitration of federal statutory claims and with the policy considerations
underpinning the effective-vindication doctrine.
In conducting effective-vindication inquiries, it is helpful to have an
appreciation of the policy consideration underpinning the doctrine. For
example, courts have grappled with how to deal with extra-contractual
promises aimed at reducing a claimant’s arbitration costs when such
promises are made in an effort to defend an effective-vindication challenge
to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement. Courts have adopted
varying responses to this strategy.222 However, careful consideration of the
policy underlying the doctrine would suggest that such offers should not be
decisive in an effective-vindication inquiry. This is because while such
extra-contractual promises advance the remedial function of federal statutory
rights, by reducing the arbitration costs of the particular litigant, the
arbitration agreements in question may well have the radical consequence of
undermining the broader deterrence function of applicable federal statutes,
by having a chilling effect on prospective claimants. In Morrison, the Sixth
Circuit held that courts should reject such extra-contractual promises
because, while they may be helpful in providing access to the individual
claimant to whom the promise is made, the cost features of the arbitration
agreement may deter other prospective litigants from vindicating their
statutory claim.223 As the court aptly noted, the overriding concern in an
effective-vindication inquiry is whether an arbitration agreement “will deter
potential litigants from bringing their statutory claims in the arbitral
forum.”224
Green Tree and its progeny make clear that the costs associated with
arbitration may preclude a party from vindicating her statutory rights, even


222. For a summary of the relevant cases, see Horton, supra note 109, at 741 n.111.
223. Morrison, supra note 204, at 676–77.
224. Morrison, supra note 188, at 677. The Sixth Circuit has not consistently applied this
approach. See, e.g., Mazera v. Varsity Ford Management Service, 565 F.3d 997, 1004–05 (6th Cir.
2009), where the court found that an arbitration agreement was enforceable despite arbitration in the
case being “prohibitively expensive” because the defendant had offered to waive some of the fees
associated with the arbitration.
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though there is divergence in terms of the focus of the inquiry. Although the
Morrison approach appears more consistent with the goal of reconciling the
FAA with the policies and goals of other federal command statues, the
Bradford test has been more widely followed. Whether cost-based
challenges can be founded on costs other than those of accessing the arbitral
forum, such as arbitrators and administrative fees, was taken up by the Court
in American Express. The Court’s answer to this important question is
discussed below.225
2. Structural Bias of Arbitration
Although Gilmer and its progeny have substantially limited the ability
of courts to use the procedural inadequacies of arbitration as justification for
refusing to enforce arbitration agreements, they do not foreclose using the
structural bias of particular systems of arbitration as the foundation of
effective-vindication challenges.226 In Gilmer, the Court indicated that the
allegation of “procedural inadequacies [in an arbitration] is best left for
resolution in specific cases.”227 This leaves open the possibility that such
inadequacies may justify refusal to compel arbitration. In this respect, the
Seventh Circuit has observed that “Gilmer left open a door for plaintiffs to
challenge mandatory arbitration of statutory claims by showing that [the]
arbitration system is structurally biased.”228
The Sixth Circuit has indicated that the structural bias of a system of
arbitration would be sufficient to sustain an effective-vindication analysis.
In Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak House,229 the court hinted that structural
bias might invalidate an arbitration agreement. The claimant argued that the
arbitration rules and procedures available for the arbitration of their Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
claims prevented them from effectively vindicating their statutory rights..
They argued that the arbitration agreement “allow[ed] for the appointment of
a biased and incompetent panel of arbitrators, as well as unduly limit[ed] the
participants’ discovery opportunities.”230 Although the case was decided on


225. See Part III(b), infra.
226. See Gilmer, supra note 124 at 30 (noting that claimants had not demonstrated that the
arbitration regime in the proposed arbitration was inadequate to guard against potential bias).
227. Id. at 33.
228. Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F. 3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999).
229. 211 F. 3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
230. Id. at 311.
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other grounds, the court was receptive to the idea that structural bias in an
arbitration framework may prevent claimants from vindicating their
statutory claims.231 The court observed that, “even if arbitration is generally
a suitable forum for resolving particular statutory claims, the specific arbitral
forum provided under an agreement must nevertheless allow for the
effective vindication of that claim.”232
Soon after, the Sixth Circuit directly addressed the issue in McMullen v.
Meijer, Inc.,233,in which a claimant argued that she should not be compelled
to arbitrate her Title VII234 claims because the arbitration agreement was
structurally biased in that it granted her employer exclusive control over the
pool of potential arbitrators. The court agreed, holding that the employer’s
unfettered control over the pool of potential arbitrators prevented the
claimant from effectively vindicating her statutory rights.235 The court
reaffirmed this approach in Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc.,236
in which it held that the structural bias in an arbitration agreement prevented
claimants from vindicating their rights under the FLSA.237 The court found
that aspects of the arbitration process biased the process against the
prospective claimant and in favor of the employer.238 The court noted that
claimants can raise structural bias allegations as part of pre-arbitration
challenges because such bias prevents arbitration from being an effective
substitute for litigation.239
Recognition that structural bias may ground an effective-vindication
challenge is certainly consistent with the policy arguments the Supreme
Court used to justify the arbitrability of statutory claims. These include the
assumption that arbitrations are effective substitutes for litigation and that


231. Id. at 314. The court expressed “serious reservations as to whether the arbitral forum [in
the case] is suitable for the resolution of statutory claims.”
232. Id. at 313.
233. 355 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2004).
234. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
235. McMullen, supra note 232, at 494. However, the court remanded the case to the district
court for determination whether the arbitrator-selection clause should be severed from the rest of the
agreement. Id. at 496.
236. 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005).
237. 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 201-219.
238. McMullen, supra note 232, at 385–88.
239. Id. at 385 (noting that the unfairness of the arbitrator-selection process makes arbitration
an ineffective substitute for the judicial forum).
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arbitrations “further broader social purposes” by allowing the realization of
both the remedial and deterrent function of federal statutes. Clearly, an
arbitration framework that is structurally biased against prospective
claimants is not an ideal substitute for litigation and would frustrate the
realization of the dual functions of federal command statutes. Moreover,
structurally biased arbitration agreements are typically aimed at preventing
claimants from vindicating their statutory rights by stacking the deck in
favor of the prospective defendant.
The structural bias aspect to effective-vindication challenges is
important for another reason. The recognition of structural bias as a basis
for invalidating arbitration agreements derives from a vitally accurate
insight: the policy considerations supporting the effective-vindication
doctrine warrant broadening its scope beyond issues relating to the costs of
accessing the arbitral forum and the application of mandatory federal laws,
areas in which these challenges have traditionally been used. It remains to
be seen how the Court’s recent decision in American Express will affect this
aspect of effective-vindication challenges.
We now turn to the applicability of effective-vindication challenges to
the waiver of class action claims.
3. Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements
Class action waivers are increasingly found in arbitration agreements.240
In the context of arbitrations, these waivers are aimed at barring contracting
parties from joining or consolidating claims in arbitration and obligating
them to pursue individual claims in separate arbitration.241 For businesses,
class action waivers are a means of minimizing exposure to problems they
associate with aggregation of claims.242 We are here concerned not with the


240. For a discussion of the evolution of the use of class waivers in arbitration agreements, see
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-total Demise of the Modern Class
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396, et seq. (2005). In her article, she uses the phrase “collective
action waivers” because these clauses typically “waiver not only the right to participate in class
actions, but also the right to participate in classwide arbitrations or to aggregate claims with others in
any form of judicial or arbitral proceeding.” Id. at 376 n.15.
241. For example, the arbitration agreement between the parties in Stachurski v. DirecTV, Inc.,
the arbitration agreement provided that “[n]either you nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate
claims in arbitration by or against other individuals or entities, or arbitrate any claim as a
representative member of a class or in a private attorney general capacity.” 642 F.Supp. 2d 758, 762
(N.D. Ohio 2009).
242. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive? 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2000). See also Maria Glover, Beyond
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merits of the arguments against the use of class actions, but on how class
action waivers adversely affect the ability of prospective claimants to
vindicate their statutory rights. Whatever the merits of the case against class
action measures, it is clear that by restricting claim aggregation, class action
waivers have the practical consequence of significantly reducing the number
of potential claims against businesses, especially where the costs and
expenses associated with arbitration pale in comparison to the potential
individual recovery.243 The preclusion of the ability to share expenses with
other claimants in a joint action may prevent prospective claimants from
vindicating their statutory rights.
Class actions have been particularly useful in aggregating claims whose
individual prosecution would be economically unfeasible.244 This role of
class actions is especially salient in the context of consumer transactions,
where the recovery for individual injury may be very little even though the
broader injury to consumers as a group is very great.245 Where potential


Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1735, 1745 (2006) (noting that corporations use class action waivers because they view plaintiffs as
exploiting “the class action procedure in order to wrest large and unfair settlements from
defendants.”).
243. As one commentator has aptly noted, businesses are “insulating themselves from liability
by contractually restricting potential plaintiffs’ use of a powerful and legitimate procedural too in
arbitration – the class action.” Byron Allyn Rice, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Stand, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 218
(2008). This trend has made it more difficult for claimants “to stand up for their rights in the face of
corporate neglect or wrongdoing.” Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not
be Televised, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 668-69 (2011).
244. This sentiment was shared by Justice Rehnquist, who observed that “[c]lass actions …
permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.” Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985). Instructively, the case in which he made the
observation involved “claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff,” which meant that “most of the
plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.” Id. In a similar
vein, the Seventh Circuit has observed that “The policy at the very core of the class action
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. Id. A class action solves this problem
by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an
attorney’s) labor. Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997), cited with
approval in Amchen Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
245. David Rosenberg has stressed the role of class actions in ameliorating the “asymmetrical
litigation power” evident in low stake claims “involving los that is large in the aggregate, but too
small as incurred by each plaintiff for a competent attorney to consider any single claim
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individual recoveries by consumers is low and the aggregate monetary
benefit from violating consumer protection laws is high, a class action
waiver may enable a corporation to violate consumer protection laws while
practically immunizing itself from liability. Consequently, a class action
waiver may operate to undermine both the remedial and the deterrent
functions of federal consumer laws.
Despite their limitations, class actions remain a strategy for providing
redress to consumers and other small players in the economy for grievances
against larger players. As Myriam Gilles has noted:
“. . . class actions – warts and all – do far more good than harm. I take it as beyond
dispute that the threat of class action liability plays a vital role in deterring corporate
wrongdoing. And while one might argue – as many scholars do – that class action in
contemporary practice may tend to over deter, or that agency costs hamper the
effectiveness of class action device, I am aware of no serious argument that we should
ditch class actions in their entirety. Everyone seems to agree that sound public policy
requires collective litigation be available for small-claim plaintiffs who would not have
the incentive or resources to remedy harms or deter wrongdoing in one-on-one
246
proceedings.”

As the frontier of arbitration continues to expand, the restriction that
class action waivers put on access to justice comes into sharper focus. In
practice, because most class action claims are founded on federal questions,
they often implicate federal statutory rights in areas such as federal
consumer law, civil rights, antitrust, and securities law.247 Because most
statutory claims are now arbitrable,248parties increasingly use arbitration as a
method of resolving these types of claims. The question necessarily arises
whether the effective-vindication doctrine may be used to resist the


economically worth prosecuting.” David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation
Function in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1906 n.62 (2002).
246. Gilles, supra note 239, at 378 (emphasis in original). While Gilles was discussing the
importance of class actions in the context of litigation, her arguments are also precisely relevant in
the context of arbitration.
247. See Gilles, supra note 246, at 391. The class action procedure is often “uniquely suited”
for the resolution of certain statutory right. See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class
Actions Survive? 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 813 (2004) (suggesting the appropriateness of class action
litigation for the resolution of Title VII cases).
248. The arbitrability of most federal statutory claims means that “individuals pursuing longestablished statutory claims, such as those brought under the federal securities and antitrust laws, and
newer but long-sought civil rights claims, including race, sex, age, and disability discrimination, may
now be forced to arbitrate if the parties are deemed to have assented to a pre-dispute arbitration
clause.” Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2004, at 55–56.
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enforcement of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. It should be
noted that the doctrine is irrelevant where a class action waiver operates to
preclude class arbitration of an entirely contractual dispute that does not
implicate statutory rights. In contrast, the doctrine will be relevant where
the waiver is alleged to have the practical consequences of preventing a
claimant from vindicating federal statutory rights.249
The evolution of judicial attitude towards the use of the effectivevindication doctrine to challenge the enforcement of class action waivers in
arbitration agreements is best understood in the context of the methods that
have been used to challenge such waivers. Unconscionability challenges
were the first line of defense against enforcing class action waivers in
arbitrations.250 The following discussion considers the unconscionability
defense to the enforcement of class action waivers and explains how the
arguments the Supreme Court used in limiting the availability of that defense
came to play an important role in narrowing the availability of effectivevindication challenges.
Unconscionability is a long-standing defense to the enforcement of
contractual obligations. Although the FAA, reflects “a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration,”251 it contains a savings clause permitting the refusal to
enforce arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in


249. Effective-vindication challenges to class waivers in arbitration agreements are
distinguishable from challenges based on the inconsistency of class waivers with the framework of
particular federal statutes. The Truth in Lending Act, for example, specifically provides for the use
of class action litigation. TRUTH IN LENDING ACT, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2000). Some claimants
have suggested that class waivers clauses were unenforceable with respect to claims under the statute
because of inherent conflict between the waiver and the enforcement scheme of the statute. Most
circuits have rejected this argument. For example, the Third Circuit has held that “simply because
judicial remedies are part of a law does not mean that Congress meant to preclude parties from
bargaining around their availability.” Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 377 (3d Cir.
2000). The court held that Truth in Lending Act claims were arbitrable even if class action
mechanism is unavailable. The attitude of most courts on this issue is that the mere provision for
class actions in a statute does not entail that the right is non-waivable. It would seem, therefore, that
“a congressional enactment will not be found to be facially incompatible with a collective action
waiver in the absence of a specific statutory antiwaiver provision.” Myriam Gilles, supra note 239,
at 405–06.
250. A commentator has characterized unconscionability challenges to class action waivers as
the “first-wave challenges” to their enforceability. See Gilles, supra note 246, at 399. The “secondwave challenges,” on this view, are effective-vindication defenses. Id. at 406.
251. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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equity for revocation of any contract.”252 The Supreme Court has interpreted
the savings clause as allowing the invalidation of arbitration agreements on
grounds of “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability,” while disallowing their invalidation on grounds of
defenses that apply only to arbitration.253
The unconscionability doctrine was the basis for the first wave of
challenges to the enforceability of class-action waivers in arbitration.254
California was at the forefront of these challenges.255 The California
Supreme Court emphasized the vital role of class action remedies in
consumer transactions and stressed that unconscionability challenges were
an invaluable method of halting and redressing the exploitation of
consumers.256 The Court articulated a rule [the Discover Bank rule] for
determining the enforceability of class action waivers in arbitration
agreements:
“[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,
and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums
of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.’
Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and
257
should not be enforced.”

This Discover Bank rule was influential in stimulating the trend of
unconscionability challenges to class action waivers in arbitration. Although
this trend was initially resisted in some states, “by 2011 at least fourteen
states had ruled class action waivers unenforceable on these broad public


252. Section 2 of the FAA.
253. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483, 492–93 n.9 (1987).
254. See Gilles, supra note 239 at 399-402.
255. Myriam Gilles, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 632 (2012).
256. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal 2005). The court stressed
that the importance of the unconscionability defense to the enforcement of class waivers especially
in light of the fact that in many cases the “damages in consumer cases are often small” and a
corporation may reap a handsome profit by wrongfully exacting “a dollar from each of millions of
customers.” Id.
257. Id. at 1101-1108. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1668). California courts frequently used
this rule as grounds for invalidating class action waivers. See, e.g., Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 134 Cal.
App. 4th 544, 556-57 (2005); Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 134 Cal.App. 4th 1283, 1297
(2005); Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1451-53 (2006).
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policy grounds” and the movement was towards the gradual acceptance of
the unconscionability defense to class action waivers.258
As this movement gathered momentum, the Supreme Court faced the
issue of whether the use of the defense to invalidate class action waivers in
arbitration “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
AT&T Mobility v.
full purpose and objectives of [the FAA].”259
Concepcion,260 presented the Court with the question of “whether § 2 [of the
FAA] preempts California’s rule classifying most collective-arbitration
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”261 The case arose from a
decision of the Ninth Circuit262 affirming a district court decision263
invalidating a class-action waiver on grounds of unconscionability. Vincent
and Liza Concepcion purchased a two-year service contract from AT&T,
which advertised a free or significant discounted phone in exchange for the
wireless service contracts. Although AT&T did not charge the Concepcions
for the phones, they did charge them with paying a sales tax of $30.22, based
on the full retail value of the phones. They filed a complaint against AT&T
alleging that AT&T engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging a
sales tax despite advertising the phones as free. The complaint was
subsequently consolidated in a class action against AT&T. AT&T moved to
compel arbitration, but the district court denied the motion. Although the
arbitration agreement had some consumer-friendly features, which reduced
the cost of arbitration for prospective claimants,264 the court felt compelled
by the Discover Bank rule to invalidate the agreement. According to the
court, “[f]aithful adherence to California’s stated policy of favoring class
litigation and arbitration to deter alleged fraudulent conduct in cases
involving large numbers of consumers with small amounts of damages,


258. See Gilles, supra note 239, at 633. (See note 33 for examples of cases holding that class
action waivers were unconscionable under state law).
259. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
260. 131 S. Ct. 1744 (2011).
261. Id. at 1746.
262. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009).
263. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103712, 2008 WL 5216255 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008).
264. Id. at 36. These features of the clause are summarized in the Supreme Court decision.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
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compels the Court to invalidate AT&T’s class waiver provision.”265 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and further held that the
FAA did not preempt the application of the Discover Bank rule.266
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FAA
preempted the Discover Bank rule because it stood “as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of
Congress.”267 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia indicated that the
central purpose of the FAA “is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings.”268 He reiterated the view that the FAA reflects “a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”269 He opined that the
savings clause of § 2 of the FAA, which permits the invalidation of
arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract,” does not validate state laws aimed specifically
at limiting the enforceability of arbitration agreements or “that derive their
means from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”270 Laws and
policies that discriminate against arbitration, he noted, are not the kind of
grounds for contract revocation that are a permissible basis for invalidating
arbitration agreements under § 2.271 The saving clause did not preserve statelaw rules that interfere with the realization of the objectives of the FAA. 272
By requiring the availability of class wide arbitration, the Discover Bank
rule interfered with the fundamental attributes of arbitration: “efficient,
streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”273 As a result, the
rule was inconsistent with the FAA.274 Scalia went on to discuss the ways in


265. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., at 42.
266. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, supra note 261 at 852.
267. Concepcion, supra note 260, at 1753 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
268. Concepcion, supra note 260 at 1748.
269. Id. at 1749.
270. Id. at 1746, citing Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Perry
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n. 9 (1987).
271. Concepcion, supra note 260 at 1746-48. He emphasized that a court, much like a state
legislature, may not erect impressible barriers to the accomplishments of the objectives of the FAA.
In this regard, “a court may not ‘rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a
state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to
effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.’” Id. at 1747, (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S., at 493).
272. Concepcion, supra note 260 at 1748.
273. Id. at 1749.
274. Id. at 1748.
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which class wide arbitrations interfere with the fundamental attributes of
arbitration: by sacrificing the flexibility of arbitration,275 by fostering
procedural formality,276 and by increasing the risks to corporate
defendants.277 In his view, arbitration was ill suited “to the higher stakes of
class litigation.”278 In response to the claim that “class proceedings are
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through
the legal system,” he indicated that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that
is inconsistent with the FAA even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”279
It is instructive to note that the central issue in Concepcion, which
was clearly stated in the majority opinion, was whether the FAA preempted
the Discover Bank rule.280 The Court focused its analysis on whether the
rule was valid under the savings clause of § 2. The Court’s decision that the
FAA preempted the rule was founded on essentially two grounds. The first
was the view that the savings clause “does not preserve state-law rules that
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objective.”281 The
second was its finding that by “[r]equiring the availability of classwide
arbitration,” the Discover Bank rule “interfere[d] with the fundamental
attributes of arbitration,” and was therefore inconsistent with the FAA.282
Concepcion is then best understood as answering the preemption question,
which Scalia clearly stated was the one before the Court.
As we shall see, the Court’s dismissal of the argument for the use of
class proceedings in prosecuting small-value claims that may fall through
the cracks of the legal system was to play an important role in the its
analysis of the effective-vindication doctrine in American Express.283 What
is important to appreciate at this juncture is that the Court’s dismissal of that
argument in Concepcion was perhaps understandable in light of its finding


275. Id. at 1751.
276. Id. at 1751–52.
277. Id. at 1752.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1753.
280. According to Scalia, “The question in this case is whether § 2 preempts California’s rule
classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable. We refer to
this rule as the Discover Bank rule.” Id. at 1746.
281. Id. at 1748.
282. Id.
283. See Part III(b), infra.
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that requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interfered with the
fundamental attributes of arbitration.284 If that requirement is inconsistent
with the FAA, a contestable position, then the preemption rule compels the
invalidation of a state rule enacting that requirement, regardless of the policy
merits of the requirement.
Because Concepcion subsequently played an unexpected role in
American Express, it is crucial to reiterate what Concepcion did and what it
did not do. In examining whether the FAA preempted application of the
Discover Bank rule, the Court highlighted the various reasons why, in its
opinion, the requirement of the availability of classwide arbitrations stood in
opposition to the fundamental attributes of arbitration. In light of the proarbitration policy of the FAA and that Court’s finding that the Discover
Bank rule interfered with that policy, the Supremacy Clause compelled
invalidating the rule. The preemption analysis does not turn on a balancing
of the competing public policy interests underlying the FAA, a federal law,
and the Discover Bank rule, a state rule. Under the Supremacy Clause, the
inconsistent state law is necessarily displaced. This explains the Court’s
breezy dismissal of the claim that class proceedings are necessary for the
prosecution of small-value claims. As the Court rightly noted, the
desirability of a state rule enhancing the prosecution of small-value claims
would not validate the rule if it is inconsistent with a federal statute, in this
case, the FAA.285
The Justices who decided Concepcion was not concerned with the
effective-vindication doctrine,286 and the majority rightfully did not make
any reference to the doctrine. As explained above, the effective-vindication
doctrine is a means of balancing competing public policies embodied in the
FAA and other federal statutes. In contrast, “[preemption does not describe
the effect of one federal law upon another; it refers to the supremacy of
federal law over state law when Congress, acting within its enumerated


284. For a rebuttal of the view that the Discover Bank rule was an obstacle to a fundamental
objective of the FAA, see Breyer’s dissent, Concepcion, supra note 260, at 1758-61.
285. Concepcion, supra note 260, at 1753.
286. In fact, petitioner in Concepcion rightfully assumed that the effective-vindication rule was
not in issue in the case. The petitioner stated the issue presented as follows:” Whether the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts States from conditioning the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on
the availability of particular procedures–here class-wide arbitration–when those procedures are not
necessary to ensure that the parties to the arbitration agreement are able to vindicate their rights.”
Brief for Petitioner Issue Presented, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No.
09-893), 2010 WL 3017755.
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powers, intends one to displace the other.”287 Because the effectivevindication issue was not an issue, the Court did not have to decide whether
the preclusion of class-wide arbitration would negatively affect the ability of
claimants to vindicate their federal statutory rights. In contrast to the
preemption analysis, the effective-vindication analysis would have required
the Court to balance the public policy favoring arbitration, enshrined in the
FAA, with the need to vindicate the rights enshrined in other federal statutes.
The American Express litigation, to which we now turn, presented an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to examine the modalities for conducting
this balancing-of-policies analysis: the reconciliation of the pro-arbitration
policies of the FAA with competing federal policies embodied in other
federal statutes. It also provided an opportunity for the Court to examine
whether the effective-vindication doctrine could be used to invalidate a class
action waiver. We will examine the procedural history of the litigation,
evaluate the Supreme Court decision, and explore the broader implications
of the decision on the effective-vindication doctrine and on the development
of American arbitration law.
III. THE AMERICAN EXPRESS LITIGATION
A. In the Second Circuit
The case stemmed from a class-action law suit brought against
American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., (Amex) by
several merchants alleging that Amex had engaged in an illegal “tying
arrangement” in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.288 The essential
facts were that Amex charged substantially higher fees for its charge cards
compared to other credit card providers, and merchants were willing to pay
these fees because they believed that holders of charge cards were likely to
be more affluent than holders of credit cards.289 When Amex began issuing


287. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F. 3d 5025–26, 608 (6th Cir. 2004).
288. 15 U.S.C. § 1. (2012).
289. While charge card holders are required to pay the full balance on their accounts at the end
of the billing cycle, holders of credit cards could make minimum payments at the end of the billing
cycle and pay off the balance over time. See In re Am. Express Merchs’ Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11742 1 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2006) (noting that “the credit card is a means of financing
purchases” while “the charge card is a method of payment”).
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credit cards, it charged significantly higher fees than other credit card
providers, thereby decreasing the incentive for merchants to accept Amex’s
credit cards. To ensure that merchants accepted its credit cards, Amex
included an “Honor All Cards” provision in its card acceptance agreement
with merchants. This obligated any merchant who accepted one of Amex’s
card products as payment to honor “any card or other account access device
issued by [Amex].”290 As a result, merchants who refused to honor Amex’s
credit cards were not allowed to honor Amex’s charge cards, exposing them
to the likelihood of losing “a significant portion of sales they receive[d] from
businesses, travelers, affluent customers,” and other typical users of Amex
charge cards.291 The merchants argued that the “Honor All Cards”
obligation constituted an illegal tying arrangement.292
The card acceptance agreement between Amex and the merchants
contained a mandatory arbitration provision that included a waiver of classwide arbitration.293 When Amex moved to compel arbitration under the
terms of the agreement, the merchants resisted on the grounds, inter alia,
that the class action waiver contained in the agreement would preclude them
from vindicating their statutory rights. This was because, according to them,
“each individual plaintiff would have to incur discovery costs amounting to
hundreds of thousands of dollars, despite seeking average damages of only
$5000.”294 The district court held that the arbitration agreement was broad
enough to apply to the disputes between the parties and that the merchants’
substantive claims, including that regarding the enforceability of the class


290. In re Am. Express Merchs’ Litig., 554 F. 3d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2009), [hereinafter “Amex
I”].
291. Id.
292. Tying arrangements have been defined as “an agreement by a party to sell one product but
only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that
he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Cited with approval in Amex I, id. at 308., supra note 289, at 308. (quoting N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)).
293. The relevant portion of the agreement provided as follows:
IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT TO A CLAIM,
NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM
IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRAILTRAILTRIAL ON THAT CLAIM . . .
FURTHER, YOU WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY OR AS A MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF
CLAIMANTS PARTAINIGPARTAINIGPERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT
TO ARBITRATION.
Amex I., supra note 289, at 306.
294. In re Am. Express Merchs’ Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11742 at 4.
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action waiver provision, were subject to arbitration.295 The court granted
Amex’s motion to compel arbitration. Because it held that the enforceability
of the class waiver provision was an issue for the arbitrator, the court did not
rule on the merchants’ effective-vindication defense, although it was
skeptical about its cogency.296
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that it was proper for the lower court
to decide the question of the enforceability of the class action waiver. It then
proceeded to consider the merchants’ effective-vindication defense.
According to the court, the issue was narrow: whether the class action
waiver contained in the parties’ agreement was enforceable.297 The court
distinguished this case from Gilmer298 by noting that, unlike in Gilmer, the
merchants in the instant case were not arguing that the class action waiver
was unenforceable merely because the relevant statute allowed class action.
Instead they were contending that the enforcement of the class action waiver
would preclude them from vindicating their statutory rights.299 Relevant to
the case, in the court’s opinion, was Green Tree,300 which placed the burden
on the claimant in an effective-vindication case to prove that arbitration was
prohibitively expensive.301 In the view of the court, the merchants
discharged this burden because there was abundant evidence in the record
that they would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate their
disputes with Amex.


295. See In re Am. Express Merchs' Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11742 at 6 (noting that
issues relating to the enforceability of the class action waiver was for the arbitrator to decide “once
arbitrability is established.”).
296. In the view of the court, the “Plaintiffs’ contention . . . that the costs of individual
arbitration would eclipse the value of any potential recovery, ignores the statutory protections
provided by the Clayton Act…” In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., id. at 5. Section 4 of the Act,
which the court cited in support of this point, allows for recovery of triple damages, court costs and
reasonable attorney’s fee. In light of plaintiffs’ claim that the discovery costs outweigh the possible
average recovery by hundreds of thousands of dollars, the costs associated with the arbitration could
still preclude the plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights. The trebling of small damages, on
the plaintiffs’ account, would be insufficient to defray the cost of the expenses associated with the
arbitration.
297. Amex I, 554 supra note 289, at 305.
298. Gilmer, supra note 124.
299. Amex I. supra note 124, at 314.
300. 531Green Tree, supra note 161).
301. Amex I, 554 supra note 289, at 315.
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The unchallenged evidence in the record showed that the average
merchant claimant “might expect four-year damages of $1,751, or $5,252
when trebled” while “the out-of-pocket costs, just for the expert economic
study and services, would be at least several hundred thousand dollars, and
might even exceed $1million.”302 According to the court, the merchants had
demonstrated “the necessity of some class mechanism” for the vindication of
their statutory rights. The evidence showed that “the size of the recovery
received by any individual [merchant] will be too small to justify the
expenditure of bringing an individual action.”303 The court agreed with the
merchants that the practical consequence of enforcing the class action
waiver would be that “no small merchant may challenge American
Express’s tying arrangements under the federal antitrust laws.”304 In effect,
the class action waiver operated to grant Amex de facto immunity from
liability for violating its obligations under U.S. antitrust laws and was
therefore unenforceable.305
The court stressed that class action waivers were not per se
unenforceable. Each case had to be reviewed on its merits to gauge its effect
on the ability of prospective claimants to vindicate their statutory rights.306
In its decision, the Second Circuit sought to balance the pro-arbitration
policies of the FAA with the public interest in ensuring that parties are able
to vindicate their statutory rights. Instructively, the court noted that this
balancing analysis should be conducted “with a healthy regard for the fact
that the FAA ‘is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements.’”307
On a petition for writ of certiorari by Amex, the Supreme Court vacated
the judgment and remanded it for reconsideration308 in light of its decision in
Stolt-Nelsen.309 In that case, the court held that a party may not be


302. Id. at 317 (testimony of Gary L. French, an economist retained by the merchants. Amex
had suggested that the merchants could reduce the experts’ costs by sharing them with other
merchants that were suing Amex in similar litigation. However, the court rejected this argument,
noting that the parties’ agreement precluded the sharing of costs. The agreement provided that “[t]he
arbitration proceeding and all testimony, filings, documents and any information relating to or
presented during the arbitration proceedings shall be deemed to be confidential information not to be
disclosed to any other party.” Id. at 318.
303. Id. at 320.
304. Id. at 319.
305. Id. at 320.
306. Id. at 321.
307. Id.
308. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).
309. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).

>=:

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss3/4

56

Chukwumerije: The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication Doctrine i

5$!0;>/=A?.<:;>6


       

compelled to “submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis
for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”310 This principle derives
from the fact that consent is one of the foundational principles of the
FAA.311 Consequently, a party may not be forced into class wide arbitration
without its consent. In the Court’s view, in light of the fundamental changes
brought by a change from bilateral to classwide arbitration, an arbitrator may
not infer from the silence of the parties’ agreement that they had consented
to class proceedings.312
Stolt-Nelsen was, however, relevant to the effective-vindication analysis
conducted by the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit did not order class
arbitration in its original decision. What it did was find that the waiver of
class arbitration was unenforceable because it operated to preclude the
prospective claimants from vindicating their statutory rights. Stolt-Nelsen
stands for the principle that a party cannot be compelled to engage in class
arbitration without its consent, and that silence of an arbitration agreement
on the availability of class arbitration is not indicative of the contracting
parties consenting to class arbitration. Nothing in this principle suggests that
the non-availability of class arbitration may not operate to confer de facto
immunity to a prospective defendant, and thereby, have the consequence, as
the Second Circuit found, of preventing a party from vindicating his or her
federal statutory rights.
On remand, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its previous decision, finding
that its original analysis was not affected by Stolt-Nielsen.313 The court
rightly noted that the analysis in its previous decision focused not on
whether the parties’ agreement provided for class arbitration, but on whether
the class action waiver precluded the merchants from effectively vindicating
their federal statutory rights.314 The availability of a class action mechanism,
in the court’s view, is important in this analysis. The court noted that the
Supreme Court itself had previously acknowledged the relevance of the class
action mechanism as a “vehicle for vindicating federal statutory rights” in
cases where it is the “only economically rational alternative” for prosecuting


310. Id. at 1775.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1776.
313. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Amex II].
314. Id. at 193-94.
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small-value claims.315 The Second Circuit reiterated its previous finding that
“Amex has brought no serious challenge to the plaintiffs’ demonstration that
their claims cannot reasonably be pursued as individual actions . . . in
arbitration.”316 Accordingly, it reaffirmed its finding that the class action
waiver was unenforceable as it precluded the claimants from effectively
vindicating their statutory rights.317
Shortly after Amex II was decided, the Supreme Court issued its ruling
in Concepcion,318 invalidating the Discover Bank rule on the grounds that it
was preempted by the FAA. It would be recalled that the rule required the
availability of class actions in certain consumer disputes. The Second
Circuit decided to consider the effect of Concepcion on its decision in Amex
III.319 Concepcion was essentially a preemption case in which the court held
that states cannot interfere with the realization of the fundamental objectives
of arbitration by requiring the availability of class wide arbitrations.
Instructively, the preemption analysis does not, as the effective-vindication
analysis does, require the courts to balance the competing policies embodied
in the FAA and other federal statutes. For this reason, Concepcion did not
have to determine whether the non-availability of class arbitration precluded
the claimants from vindicating their statutory rights.
The Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Amex III. It found that
while “Concepcion plainly offers a path for analyzing whether a state
contract law is preempted by the FAA,” Amex was concerned with
something different: the effective-vindication of statutory rights.320 It noted
that Concepcion did not decide that class action waivers are per se
enforceable,321 neither did it invalidate the effective-vindication doctrine
articulated by the court in Mitsubishi and Green Tree.322 Applying the
effective vindication doctrine, the court reaffirmed that because individual
actions against Amex were not economically feasible, the class waiver


315. Id. at 194 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974)) (“Economic
reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed as a class action or not at all.”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a
solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”).
316. Amex II, 634 F.3d at 199 (citing Amex I, 554 F.3d at 319).
317. Id.
318. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
319. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Amex III].
320. Id. at 213.
321. Id. at 214.
322. Id. at 214-17.
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provision effectively precluded the merchants from vindicating their
statutory rights, and was therefore unenforceable.323
The final phase in the protracted proceedings in the Second Circuit was
the decision of the court denying a request for en banc review of its previous
ruling.324 Concurring in the denial of en banc review, Circuit Judge Pooler
reiterated the fact that unlike Concepcion, which dealt with the preemption
of state “rights existing under a common law of unconscionability,” Amex
involved a different question: “whether the FAA always trumps rights
created by a competing federal statute.”325
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Jacobs argued that Amex II swept
too broadly and established a principle “that, in the hands of class action
lawyers, can be used to challenge virtually every consumer arbitration
agreement that contains a class action waiver.”326 He was concerned that
such challenges involve “searching” inquiries that would add “more delay,
expense, and uncertainty” to the arbitration process.327 It should be noted
that the dissent did not weigh this efficiency argument against the
fundamental objective of ensuring that claimants are able to vindicate their
statutory rights. The FAA surely reflects a pro-arbitration policy and
promotes the use of arbitration as an efficient method of dispute resolution.
However, the question remains whether the pro-arbitration policy of the
FAA invariably trumps other competing polices embodied in other federal
statutes? The dissent did not provide an adequate answer to this question,328
and as we shall see, neither did the majority of the Supreme Court which
reversed the decision of the Second Circuit.


323. Id. at 218–19. The court emphasized the point that it was not ordering class arbitration,
but was merely pronouncing on the enforceability of the class action waiver. Id. at 219.
324. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012) (hereinafter Amex IV).
325. Id. at 140.
326. Id. at 143 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 144–45 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
328. Chief Judge Jacobs makes two crucial points that presage the decision of the majority of
the Supreme Court in this case. He argues that since the Court in Concepcion has held that “the
FAA preempts even state law that permits evasion of a class action waiver clause,” there was no
basis for “permitting precisely the same sort of evasion as part” of an effective-vindication analysis.
Id. at 146–47 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). He further construes Green Tree as dealing with the “cost of
access to an arbitral forum” and not the overall cost of litigation or arbitrating a claim. Id. at 147
(Jacobs, J., dissenting). I consider these arguments below, as part of the evaluation of the Supreme
Court’s decision.
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B. In the Supreme Court: Narrowing the Scope of the Doctrine
In the Supreme Court, Amex argued that, in reaching its decision, the
Second Circuit ignored the FAA’s mandate that arbitration agreements
should be enforced in accordance with their terms. They also contended that
the decision contravened Concepcion which, according to them, forbade
“refus[ing] to enforce an arbitration agreement on the ground that it
precluded class wide arbitration procedures.”329 Advocating a restrictive
reading of Green Tree330 and Mitsubishi,331 Amex suggested that the former
was concerned only with “costs associated with access to the arbitral
forum,”332 while the latter dealt only with the refusal of arbitrators to apply
federal substantive law.333 It disputed the policy arguments in support of
class wide arbitrations. In any event, Amex argued, the FAA compelled
enforcement of the arbitration agreement and that “it is Congress’s
prerogative to weigh [the competing policy considerations relating to the
availability of classwide arbitration] and limit bilateral arbitration where it
deems appropriate.”334
Before the Supreme Court, the respondent merchants clarified that they
were not insisting on class proceedings, but merely wanted to ensure that the
arbitration agreement did not operate to preclude them from vindicating their
federal statutory rights.335 They argued that the effective-vindication
doctrine was a recognized part of the court’s jurisprudence,336 promoted the
legitimacy of arbitration,337 and was broad enough to invalidate the instant
arbitration agreement.338

329. Brief for Petitioners at 27, Am. Express Co., et al., v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013) (No. 12-133), 2012 WL 6755152.
330. Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
331. Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
332. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 328, at 18. In Amex’s view, such costs included filing
fees, arbitrator’s fees and other administrative fees, but did not extend to “litigation costs generally.”
Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 19.
335. Brief for Respondents, at 17–18, Am. Express Co., et al., v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.
Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 267025.
336. They disputed the narrow interpretation given to Mitsubishi and Green Tree by Amex. In
their view, the two cases and their progeny “does not turn on the precise way in which the agreement
or the costs of arbitrating prevent the vindication of substantive rights. What matters is whether, not
precisely why, the federal statutory claims can be resolved in the arbitral forum.” Id. at 25.
337. They argued that enforcing arbitration agreement such as the instant one that precludes
them from accessing the arbitral forum “may cause the public to lose confidence in arbitration as a
legitimate mechanism of dispute resolution.” Brief of Professional Arbitrators and Arbitration
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It bears noting that the merchants advocated a narrow version of the
effective-vindication doctrine. Had this narrow version been accepted by the
Court, it would have significantly limited the availability of the doctrine to
prospective claimants. According to the claimants, they were not insisting
on class proceedings. Their central concern was the availability of a
mechanism that allowed them to recoup the costs associated with the
proceedings, particularly the high expert costs, should they prevail.339 They
were amenable to non-class arbitration so long as Amex was willing to allow
a system that enabled them to recoup costs associated with the arbitration.
To this end, they noted that “[i]f Petitioners prefer non-class arbitration, they
could offer to shift Respondents’ costs, or they could permit Respondents to
share those costs through mechanisms other than class proceedings.”340
The position canvassed by the merchants would limit the applicability of
cost-related effective-vindication challenges to cases where the nonrecoupable costs incurred by the potential claimants would be higher than
their potential net recovery. The practical consequence of this position
would be to make effective-vindication challenges unavailable in cases
where an arbitration agreement has a chilling effect on the ability of
prospective claimants to bring a claim, especially where the maximum
recovery in individual arbitrations is so low as to be worth the effort of
prosecuting the claim. As one commentator has rightly noted, “[o]nce the
question has been reduced to a clinical calculation that asks only whether
non-recoupable costs exceed the recovery sought . . . it should be clear that
few camels will make it through the eye of this needle.”341
The Supreme Court was to reject this narrow conception of cost-based
effective-vindication challenge in favor of an even more parsimonious
version.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia framed the issue before the
Court as being “whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is


Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16, Am. Express Co., et al., v. Italian Colors
Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 457379.
338. Brief for Respondents, supra note 334, at 57.
339. Id. at 17–18.
340. Id. at 18.
341. Myrian E. Gilles, Gutting the Vindication-of-Rights Challenge to Arbitration Agreements,
82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 25), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2263401.
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enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of
individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential
recovery.”342 The majority answered in the negative, holding that the
effective-vindication doctrine applies where an arbitration agreement
operates to eliminate the “right to pursue” a statutory claim, but not where it
merely makes it “not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory”
claim.343 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the pro-arbitration
mandate of the FAA, narrowly interpreted its decisions in Mitsubishi and
Green Tree, and broadly construed its ruling in Concepcion.
Scalia began by reiterating the view that § 2 of the FAA requires “courts
[to] ‘rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.’”344
In his view, the mandate to enforce arbitration agreements applies with equal
force to federal statutory claims, unless the mandate “has been ‘overridden
by a contrary congressional command.’”345 This framing of the issue blurs
the historical context of the arbitrability of federal statutory claims. The
Court was initially cautious in allowing the arbitration of federal statutory
claims. In gradually allowing the arbitration of federal statutory claims, the
Court recognized the need to balance the pro-arbitration mandate of the FAA
with the policies embodied in other federal statutes. While the Court has
consistently viewed the FAA as rejecting the antiquated judicial hostility
towards arbitration, it has in the past been careful to moderate the
commitment to allowing the arbitration of federal statutory claims with the
need to advance the functions of relevant federal statutory regimes. The
effective-vindication doctrine has served as the moderating mechanism in
U.S. arbitration law.
Prior decisions of the Supreme Court have stressed the importance of
the doctrine as a limiting principle to the arbitrability of federal statutory
claims. For example, in rejecting the argument that, because of the
important social policies promoted by the ADEA, arbitration was not an
appropriate forum for arbitrating claims arising under the Act, the Court
observed that:


342. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2307. The Court had granted certiorari to consider “[w]hether the
Federal Arbitration Act permits courts . . . to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that
they do not permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.” Id. at 2308.
343. Id. at 2311.
344. Id. at 2309 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
345. Id. (citing CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669). Scalia found that
there was there was no congressional command requiring the invalidation of the waiver of class
arbitration in the instant case. Id.
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We do not perceive any inherent inconsistency between those policies, however, and
enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. . . . The Sherman Act, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed
to advance important public policies, but [we have held that] claims under those statutes
are appropriate for arbitration. “[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
346
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”

In contrast, Scalia minimizes the role of the effective-vindication
doctrine as a limiting principle by stipulating “contrary congressional
command” as the major limitation to the arbitrability of federal statutory
claims. He emphasizes that the effective-vindication exception originated as
a dictum in Mitsubishi,347 seeming not to appreciate how the exception was
central to the Court’s analysis. While it is true that the Mitsubishi Court “did
not hold that federal statutory claims are subject to arbitration so long as the
claimant may effectively vindicate his rights in the arbitral forum,”348 the
Court indicated in very strong terms that its finding on arbitrability was
informed by the belief that the claimants would be able to vindicate their
federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum. It was in this regard that it
noted that “in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue
statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in
condemning the agreement as against public policy.”349 Scalia’s dismissal of
the doctrine as a dictum in Mitsubishi reveals his skepticism of its value. He
failed to indicate that the doctrine was “an essential condition”350 of the
Court’s decision in Mitsubishi and that subsequent opinions of the Court
have acknowledged its importance in enforcing arbitration agreements
dealing with federal statutory claims.
Tellingly, Scalia states the doctrine originated from “the desire to
prevent ‘prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory
remedies.’”351 In his view, this right would be implicated by arbitration
agreements prohibiting prospective claimants from asserting federal


346. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
347. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2310.
348. Id. at 2310 n.2.
349. Mitsubishi, 473 U. S. at 637 n.19.
350. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
351. Id. at 2310 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U. S. at 637 n.19).
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statutory rights and by arbitrations where prohibitive filing and
administrative fees make “access to the forum impracticable.”352 According
to him, the doctrine would not apply where “the expense involved in
proving” a claim precludes a party from vindicating his or her federal
statutory rights; this expense “does not constitute the elimination of the right
to pursue” the claim.353 In essence, he considers the rules in Mitsubishi and
Green Tree as limited to the facts of the respective cases. The former dealt
with the application of federal substantive law in arbitration and the latter
with the effect of prohibitive filing and administrative fees in arbitration.
However, Mitsubishi and its progeny speak broadly about the ability of
prospective claimants to vindicate their federal statutory claims in the
arbitral forum. The issue of the application of relevant federal substantive
law that arose in Mitsubishi, and that of prohibitive filing and administrative
fees that arose in Green Tree, were merely illustrations of a principle of
general application. As Justice Kagan rightly notes in her dissent, the two
decisions “establish what in some quarters is known as a principle: When an
arbitration agreement prevents the effective vindication of federal rights,” a
court may invalidate the agreement.354 She notes that the principle would
apply in a range of instances, reaching “the world of other provisions a
clever drafter might devise to scuttle even the most meritorious of federal
claims.”355 Viewed in this light, the central focus of effective-vindication
inquiry ought not to be on the “precise mechanism” but on the overall effect
of the arbitration agreement on the ability of prospective claimants to
vindicate their statutory rights.356
By interpreting Mitsubishi and its progeny so narrowly, the majority
effectively shifted the focus of effective-vindication analysis from broader
concerns about the ways in which arbitration agreements preclude access to
justice in the arbitral forum to a more limited analysis of a notional “right to
pursue” federal statutory claims. It should be noted that this narrowing of
effective-vindication inquiries is incompatible with the role the doctrine has
played in reconciling the competing policies embodied in the FAA and other
federal statutes. It has hitherto served as a mechanism for reconciling the


352. Id. at 2310–11.
353. Id. at 2311.
354. Id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
355. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
356. Id. at 2317-18 (Kagan, J., dissenting). She notes that a central tenet of the Court’s
decisions on arbitration: “An arbitration clause may not thwart federal law, irrespective of exactly
how it does so.” Id. at 2313.
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pro-arbitration mandate of the FAA with the public policies embodied in
federal command statutes, thereby enabling courts to invalidate arbitration
agreements that preclude the vindication of federal statutory claims.
Prospective claimants may be precluded from vindicating their federal
statutory rights not only when a notional “right to pursue” claims is
eliminated but where the arbitration agreement and the structure of the
arbitration process have the practical consequence of precluding access to
the arbitral forum. For example, the Sixth Circuit has used the doctrine to
invalidate an agreement due to the structural bias of the arbitration process.
Scalia’s narrowing of the focus of effective-vindication inquires would seem
to preclude the use of the doctrine in this context. On Scalia’s narrow
construction, structural bias does not inhibit the “right to pursue” claims,
even though it may have the practical consequence of ensuring that
violations of federal statutory rights go without being redressed.
The reconciliation of the FAA and other federal statutes requires more
than the protection of the “right to pursue” claims in an arbitral forum. It
requires ensuring that arbitration does not become a forum for stifling
federal statutory claims, a function that the effective-vindication doctrine has
hitherto performed.
Scalia probably believes that the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate
compels a narrow conception of the doctrine. After all, the arbitrability of
federal statutory claims can always be “overridden by a contrary
congressional command.”357 However, Congress has rarely expressly
excluded the arbitrability of federal statutory claims, a fact that does not
necessitate the conclusion that Congress countenances the use of arbitration
to stifle federal claims. As Kagan notes, Congress did not intend the FAA to
become “a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious
federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”358 In enacting the
FAA, Congress commanded the enforcement of arbitration as a tailored and
streamlined mechanism for redressing injuries, not a means of granting “de
facto immunity” to potential defendants.359
Nonetheless, the majority has now narrowed the doctrine to protect only
the “right to pursue” a claim. According to Scalia this right is implicated


357. Id. at 2309.
358. Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
359. Id. at 2315, 2320.
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when an agreement “forbid[s] the assertion of certain statutory rights” and
“perhaps [when] filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration . . . are
so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”360 In contrast, he
indicates that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a
statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue
that remedy.”361 However, Scalia does not clearly explain why prohibitive
filing and administrative fees may operate to eliminate the right, but costs
associated with “proving” a claim would not. Green Tree was concerned
with the alleged effects of prohibitive filing and administrative fees, but
there was nothing in that case that suggested that the doctrine would not
apply to other expenses associated with arbitrating a dispute.362 In fact, there
is little principled basis for confining cost-based effective-vindication
challenges to prohibitive “filing and administrative fees,” a limitation the
dissent characterized as a “weirdly idiosyncratic.”363
In support of his decision that the arbitration agreement did not
adversely affect the merchants’ “right to purse” their claims, Scalia observes
that class action waivers merely limit arbitration proceedings to the
contracting parties, but do not eliminate the right to pursue federal statutory
claims.364 It is nonetheless evident that the non-availability of class-action
proceedings may in particular instances make the expenses associated with
arbitration, when compared to litigation, so prohibitive as to preclude a
prospective claimant from vindicating their federal statutory rights. This
was precisely the argument made by the merchants. Practically immunizing
oneself from suit by making unavailable in compulsory arbitration
procedures that are available to a party in litigation has the same practical
consequence as eliminating the federal statutory claim.
Scalia emphasizes that class action proceedings only became generally
available in 1938, after the passage of the FAA.365 In his view, mechanisms
that were considered sufficient to assure effective-vindication of a federal
statutory right prior to the emergence of class-action procedures “did not
suddenly become ‘ineffective vindication’ upon their adoption.”366 He


360. Id. at 2310–11.
361. Id. at 2311.
362. See id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that Green Tree “gave no hint of
distinguishing among the different ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to
bring”).
363. Id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 2311.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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argues that “time does not change the meaning of effectiveness, making
ineffective vindication today what was effective vindication in the past.”367
But what is required for a party to vindicate its statutory rights is not frozen
in time. The focus ought not to be on what, at the time a particular statute
was enacted, would preclude a right from being effectively vindicated, but
on whether, at the time of the hearing, the arbitration agreement operates to
preclude the effective vindication of rights. After all, the doctrine is a
method of reconciling the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA with the policy
embodied in other federal command statutes. What would enable a party
properly to vindicate its rights may change over time. In the instant context,
the emergence of class-action proceedings substantially enhanced the ability
of consumers and small-value claimants to prosecute federal statutory
claims. This materially altered the calculation of what is necessary to
vindicate such claims in an arbitral forum.
Cost-based effective-vindication analysis involves, in part, a comparison
of the relevant costs of litigation and arbitration. It is difficult to envisage a
cost-based effective-vindication challenge succeeding where the cost of
arbitration is lower than the cost of litigation. In weighing the cost
implications of arbitration agreements, courts look towards the relative costs
of litigation and arbitration at the time of the proceedings, not the relative
cost at the time the federal command statute was enacted. Similarly, when
the waiver of class arbitration is alleged to preclude the vindication of
statutory rights, the focus should be on the current state of affairs. Whether
the procedural device in question was available at the time the federal statute
was enacted is irrelevant in this regard. As Kagan rightfully notes, “the
effective-vindication rule asks about the world today, not the world as it
might have looked when Congress passed a given statute.”368
Scalia cites Gilmer369 and Vimar370 in support of his conclusion that the
class waiver clause was enforceable.371 In Gilmer, the claimant had argued
that arbitration of the claim would not adequately enhance the goals of the


367. Id.
368. Id. at 2319 (Kagan, J., dissenting). She adds that the application of the doctrine “requires
courts to determine in the here and now—rather than in ye olde glory days—whether an agreement’s
provisions foreclose even meritorious [federal] claims.” Id.
369. 500 U.S. 20.
370. 515 U.S. 528.
371. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2311–12.
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ADEA372 because the arbitration agreement in question did not “provide
for . . . class actions.”373 The Court rejected the argument, holding that the
fact that the ADEA provided for the possibility of class actions did not mean
that it barred “individual attempts at conciliation.”374 It is noteworthy that
the claimant in Gilmer, unlike those in Amex, did not argue that a class
action waiver had the practical consequence of preventing them from
vindicating their statutory claims. Instead, the claimant in Gilmer was
concerned that arbitration did not “adequately further the purposes of the
ADEA,” merely because it did not provide for class proceedings.375
Similarly, Vimar was not concerned with the effective vindication of
federal statutory rights. There, the claimant resisted a motion to compel
arbitration on the grounds that the inconvenience and cost of the arbitration
proceeding would lessen the liability of the carrier under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (CGSA).376 The Act prohibited agreements lessening the
liability of a carrier. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the
CGSA did not “require courts to proceed case by case to tally the costs and
burdens to particular plaintiffs in light of their means, the size of their
claims, and the relative burden on the carrier.”377 Instructively, the
claimants never argued that the cost of arbitration precluded them from
vindicating their statutory claim. Their argument was that those costs,
together with the inconvenience of arbitration, lessened the liability of
carrier. When the Vimar Court stated that it was “unwieldy and unsupported
by the terms or policy of the statute” to require the “tally[ing of] costs and
burdens” of arbitration,378 it was considering whether such tallying was
necessary to determine if an arbitration agreement lessened the liability of
the carrier. In contrast, such a tallying would be necessary in an effectivevindication analysis, where the claim is not just that the liability of the
defendant is lessened, but that an arbitration agreement would have the
practical consequence of precluding the vindication of federal statutory
rights.


372. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
373. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1988).
377. Vimar, 515 U.S. at 536.
378. Id.
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Scalia goes on to suggest that the Court’s decision in Concepcion379 “all
but resolves this case.”380 He notes Concepcion decided that class
arbitrations “sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its
informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to
generate procedural morass than final judgment.”381 Concepcion, it would
be recalled, held that a state court could not condition the enforceability of
an arbitration agreement on the availability of class proceedings.
Concepcion found that such a requirement would “interfere with
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create a scheme inconsistent
with the FAA.”382
However, the issue in Concepcion was not whether the arbitration
agreement precluded the claimants from vindicating their statutory rights. In
fact, the claimants in Concepcion neither argued nor suggested that they
could not vindicate their federal statutory rights under the framework of their
arbitration agreement. The concern of the Court in Concepcion was with the
Discover Bank rule, a California rule, which conditioned enforcement of
certain arbitration agreements on the availability of class proceedings. The
validity of this state rule did not require consideration of the effectivevindication doctrine. Moreover, as the majority noted in Concepcion, “the
claim [in dispute] was most unlikely to go unresolved,” because the AT&T
arbitration agreement in that case contained consumer-friendly provisions
that provided adequate “incentive[s] for the individual prosecution of
meritorious claims.”383 It was precisely because effective-vindication was
not before it that the Concepcion Court did not cite the Court’s effectivevindication precedents.384
As Kagan notes in her dissent, Concepcion was a preemption case.385
The central concern of the Court in Concepcion was whether the FAA
preempted the California Discover Bank rule.386 Concepcion held that the


379. 131 S. Ct. 1740.
380. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312.
381. Id. (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751).
382. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
383. Id. at 1753.
384. Justice Kagan emphasizes this point in arguing Concepcion did not control the outcome of
American Express. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
385. Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
386. See supra text accompanying note 256.
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state rule was preempted by the FAA because it interfered with the
fundamental objectives of the FAA. Because Concepcion was a preemption
case, the Court did not have to reconcile the pro-arbitration policy of the
FAA with the policy embodied in other federal command statutes, as it is
required to do in an effective-vindication inquiry. As Kagan rightly notes, in
preemption cases the Court has “no earthly interest (quite the contrary) in
vindicating [the state] law.”387 Effective-vindication becomes relevant only
where there is a conflict between the FAA and another federal statute. In
effective-vindication inquiries, unlike in preemption analysis, “one law does
not automatically bow to the other, and the effective-vindication rule serves
as a way to reconcile any tension between them.”388
Nonetheless, Scalia believes that Concepcion was more than a
preemption case and that it establishes rules that apply broadly to
arbitrations. According to him, Concepcion categorically “rejected the
argument that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might
otherwise slip through the legal system.’”389 However, he did not discuss
the reasons why the court rejected that argument. The Court in Concepcion
gave two reasons for that position. The first was the fact that “States cannot
require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable
for unrelated reasons.”390 This consideration is, however, irrelevant in an
effective-vindication inquiry, because the relevant tension is not with State
law but with the policy embodied in a federal statute that has the same
constitutional force as the FAA. The second reason given by the
Concepcion Court was that the claim involved in that case “was most
unlikely to go unresolved” because of the consumer-friendly features of the
arbitration agreement.391 In essence, the reasons Concepcion gave for
rejecting the need for class arbitration were not directly relevant to the issues
before the Court in Amex.
In effect, Scalia decouples the Concepcion statement about class
arbitration from its preemption context and uses it in service of a thinly
founded effort to whittle down the scope of the effective-vindication
doctrine. This leads him to make the rather startling claim that Concepcion
establishes that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements


387. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 2312 (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753).
390. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
391. Id.
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trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.”392
What support does he provide for this sweeping declaration? Nothing more
than Concepcion’s rejection of the view that “class proceedings are
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims,”393 a rejection that, as explained
above, the Concepcion Court justified by reference to the preemption rule
and by emphasizing the fact that the “claim [in Concepcion] was most
unlikely to go unresolved.”394 From that rather thin premise, Scalia derives
the sweeping generalization that the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration
agreements invariably trumps any public interest in “ensuring the
prosecution of low-value claims.”395
Scalia concludes his judgment with an efficiency argument against costbased effective-vindication challenges. According to him, such challenges
would require courts to evaluate theories supporting a claim, the evidence
necessary to prove them, and the damages recoverable in the event of
success.396 He suggests that this pre-arbitration inquiry “would undoubtedly
destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in general and
bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure.”397 He states that such
a judicially-created inquiry is not sanctioned by the FAA.398 Tellingly,
Scalia never mentions the countervailing concern of enabling claimants to
vindicate their federal statutory rights. Efficiency is certainly one of the
laudable advantages of arbitration and one of the compelling reasons for
embracing arbitration as an alternative to litigation. In fact, the expeditious
resolution of disputes was a motivating consideration for the enactment of
the FAA.
However, efficiency is not invariably the determinative
consideration, especially where it comes into conflict with the vindication of
vital rights granted by Congress. By stating the efficiency argument without
counterbalancing it with other competing policy considerations, Scalia fails
to conduct the kind of careful balancing of interests required in effectivevindication inquiries.


392. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5.
393. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
394. Id.
395. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5.
396. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312.
397. Id.
398. Id.
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What is more, the efficiency argument is not as compelling as it appears
at first blush. The effective-vindication doctrine has been a part of U.S.
arbitration law since it was first propounded in Mitsubishi. Yet there is little
evidence that it has proven an obstacle to the speedy resolution of disputes in
arbitration. There is no evidence that these inquires have “destroy[ed] the
prospect of speedy resolution” of disputes by arbitration.399 Moreover, the
Court has put a heavy burden of proof on claimants in effective-vindication
challenges.400 This burden has proved difficult in practice for most
claimants to sustain, with the result that most of the challenges end in
failure. As Kagan notes, the court has placed limits on the doctrine “which
ensure that it does not diminish arbitration’s benefits.”401 Consequently, the
doctrine has “operated year in and year out without undermining, much less
‘destroy[ing],’ the prospect of speedy dispute resolution that arbitration
secures.”402
Kagan’s dissent demonstrates a keen understanding of the role the
doctrine has played in ensuring access to justice in arbitration, in
legitimizing the role of arbitration, and in reconciling the policies reflected
in the FAA with those embodied in other federal statutes. She notes that the
doctrine is a “limiting principle” to the arbitrability of federal statutory
claims, aimed at safeguarding federal rights.403 The doctrine operates to
prevent prospective defendants from immunizing themselves from liability
for violations of federal statutes.404 It ensures that arbitration agreements do
not “chok[e] off a plaintiff’s ability to enforce congressionally created
rights.”405
Unlike Scalia, Kagan attempts to reconcile the doctrine with the FAA.
She puts the FAA in its proper historical context, noting that it favors
arbitration as a flexible and streamlined method of resolving disputes, not a
forum for snuffing out legitimate claims.406 The FAA was not designed as
an enabling device for conferring de facto immunity to prospective


399. Id.
400. See supra text accompanying note 172.
401. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
403. Id. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting). She notes that the doctrine was “an essential
condition” for permitting the arbitration of federal statutory claims. Id. at 2317 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
404. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the doctrine precludes arbitration
agreements from “operat[ing] to confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal claims”).
405. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
406. Id. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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defendants, she observes, but as a method of promoting actual resolution of
disputes in arbitrations.407 The effective-vindication doctrine advances this
goal “by ensuring that arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of dispute
resolution.”408 It does this, in part, by incentivizing prospective defendants
to fashion arbitration procedures that facilitate, not impede, the efficient
resolution of disputes.409 The realization that courts would refuse to enforce
agreements that operate to immunize prospective defendants from liability
for violating federal laws encourages the formation of arbitration agreements
that promote actual resolution of disputes. Kagan notes that while the
doctrine provides a conducive environment for “[m]ore arbitration [and]
better enforcement of federal statutes,” its absence would lead to “[l]ess
arbitration [and] poorer enforcement of federal statutes.”410 She cautions
that the majority’s attenuation of the doctrine may lead arbitration “to
become . . . a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious
federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”411 This would be far
from the tailored and streamlined system facilitating the redress of injuries
envisaged by the drafters of the FAA.
In contrast to Scalia, Kagan views Mitsubishi412 and Green Tree413 as
establishing a principle of general application barring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements that prevent the vindication of federal rights.414 Also
in contrast to Scalia, she recognizes that this principle applies in a diverse
range of circumstances,415 extending beyond non-application of federal
substantive law and prohibitive costs of accessing arbitration, the two areas
to which Scalia was inclined to confine the doctrine.416 For Kagan, the focus
is not on the precise nature of the measure in question, but on whether it
operates to preclude the vindication of a party’s federal right. This leads her


407. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“What the FAA prefers to litigation is arbitration, not de facto
immunity”).
408. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
409. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
410. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
411. Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
412. 473 U.S. at 614.
413. 531 U.S. at 79.
414. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (Kagan).
415. Id. at 2317–18.
416. Id. at 2310–11.
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to reject as “weirdly idiosyncratic” the attempt to limit cost-based effectivevindication challenges to those areas that were at issue in Green Tree and
Mitsubishi.417 She views the principle as being broad enough to “cover the
world of . . . provisions a clever drafter might devise to scuttle even the most
meritorious federal claims.”418
Kagan puts the effective-vindication doctrine in its broader historical
context and demonstrates how the doctrine is both consistent with and also
furthers the goals of the FAA. Nonetheless, in applying the rule to the facts
of the case, she essentially adopts the narrow version of the doctrine
advanced by the respondents. Under this view, cost-based effectivevindication challenges would succeed only where the costs associated with
arbitrating a claim do not preclude a party from vindicating a federal
statutory claim. Her major concern with the arbitration agreement in dispute
was that its provisions had the consequence of making the costs associated
with the arbitration, particularly the expert fees, prohibitive.419
The arbitration agreement did not only include a class-action waiver, but
it also precluded “any avenue for sharing, shifting, or shrinking necessary
costs.”420 The result was that respondent’s outlay for the arbitration would
be substantially higher than their largest possible recovery. In essence, the
arbitration agreement ensured that the respondents would “[s]pend way, way
more money than [their] claim is worth, or relinquish your [federal statutory
rights].”421 In Kagan’s view, a rational actor would not elect to incur such
expenses in return for so little return.422
Instructively, Kagan believes that a more consumer-friendly arbitration
agreement, even one containing a class-waiver, would have survived an
effective-vindication challenge. She notes that an effective-vindication
challenge is concerned with “whether the arbitration agreement as a whole
precludes a claimant from enforcing federal statutory rights,” and that the
provisions should not be evaluated in isolation because they may “close off


417. Id. at 2318. Kagan noted that there was nothing distinctive about the filing and arbitrator’s
fees that were in issue in Green Tree. Moreover, she added, Green Tree “gave no hint of
distinguishing among the different ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to
bring.” Id.
418. Id. at 2317.
419. Id. at 2316.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. (noting that the claim was worth “tens of hundreds of dollars” while the costs
associated with the arbitration would run into “the hundreds of thousands.”).
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one avenue to pursue a claim while leaving others open.”423 In her view, the
arbitration agreement containing the class-waiver would not have offended
the effective-vindication doctrine “if it had provided an alternative
mechanism to share, shift, or reduce necessary costs.”424 For her, the
decisive consideration was that it foreclosed the use of those mechanisms,
such as “informal coordination among individual claims.”425
Scalia’s rejection of Kagan’s, and the respondents’, narrow conception
of the effective-vindication doctrine and his espousal of an even more
limited conception marks the decline of the doctrine. Severely limited by
the majority decision, the doctrine will no longer be helpful in ensuring the
prosecution of small value claims. We now turn to the broad implications of
Scalia’s parsimonious version of the effective-vindication doctrine.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NARROWING OF THE EFFECTIVE-VINDICATION
DOCTRINE
A. Small Value Claims
Amex substantially narrows the avenues for resisting the enforcement of
arbitration agreements where they practically limit access to justice.
Although Amex involved a business dispute regarding the enforcement of
antitrust laws, it will have stronger resonance outside this context. Its impact
will especially be felt in the areas of consumer transactions and labor
relations, areas where class proceedings are frequently the most effective
mechanism for vindicating the statutory rights of prospective claimants.
Amex has essentially limited the availability of effective-vindication
challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements to cases where
they interfere with the exercise of the “right to pursue” federal statutory
remedies.426 The exercise of this notional “right to pursue” federal statutory
claims is not, in the view of the majority, implicated where the costs
associated with arbitration make it “not worth the expense involved in


423. Id. at 2318 (emphasis in original).
424. Id. (emphasis in original).
425. Id.
426. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2310.
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proving a statutory remedy.”427 According to the majority, the right is
implicated only where arbitration agreements “forbid[] the assertion of
certain statutory rights” and “perhaps . . . [where] filing and administrative
fees attached to arbitration are so high as to make access to the forum
impracticable.”428
The reality is that in many consumer transactions and employee wageand-hour suits brought under the FLSA, individual recoveries are often
notoriously lower than the costs associated with individual arbitration. Class
proceedings are consequently the most effective mechanism for prosecuting
these claims. Individually unviable, these suits become economically
feasible to prosecute when aggregation ensures the sharing of costs and
expenses. Hitherto, consumers and employees have used effectivevindication challenges for resisting the enforcement of class action waivers
in small value claims. The usual argument is that these waivers operate to
preclude small value claimants from vindicating their statutory rights
because the individual prosecution of these claims is frequently
economically unfeasible. Sadly, Amex has now all but eliminated this
ground for resisting class action waivers.
Proponents of class action waivers often contend that “informal
coordination among claimants” is a way of encouraging the prosecution of
small value claims. Interestingly, Kagan suggests this as a solution.429
Along this line, one commentator has suggested that where class
proceedings are waived, consumers can “band together to share the cost of
attorneys’ fees and expert fees.”430 In his view, even though small value
claimants would have to pursue their claims individually, “sharing costs
could make their claims economically viable.”431 However, practice belies
this claim. Characterizing this view as “magical thinking,” another
commentator has aptly noted that “courts have tossed hundreds of class
actions in the two years since Concepcion, and none of them was
subsequently revived as a mass of individual arbitrations with shared
costs.”432


427. Id. at 2311 (emphasis omitted).
428. Id. at 2310–11.
429. See text accompanying note 424, supra.
430. Andrew Pincus, quoted in Alison Frankel, What Hope Remains for Consumers,
Employers after SCOTUS Amex Ruling, REUTERS BLOG (June 20, 2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/06/20/what-hope-remains-for-consumers-employeesafter-scotus-amex-ruling-2/.
431. Id.
432. See Paul Bland, quoted in Alison Frankel, id.
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Amex indicates that the effective-vindication inquiry focuses on the
ability of individual claimants to exercise their “right to pursue” statutory
remedies. On this view, the question is whether an arbitration agreement
adversely precludes an individual claimant from exercising his or her right to
pursue a federal statutory claim. This may result from the agreement
forbidding the assertion of the right or from filing and administrative fees
that make access impracticable. However, most arbitration clauses do not
prevent the assertion of federal statutory claims. Consequently, the first
prong of the right would rarely be at issue. With respect to the second prong,
“consumer-friendly” arbitration agreements will become increasingly
relevant. These agreements seek to reduce the cost of filing and
administrative fees without necessarily addressing the issue of economic
unviability of individual claims. Even though they may reduce filing and
administrative fees borne by small-value claimants, these “consumerfriendly” arbitration provisions do not usually provide sufficient incentive
for prospective claimants to prosecute legitimate grievances. It is often
difficult to find attorneys willing to handle such low-value claims
individually. Class proceedings, which enable the accumulation of costs and
benefits, provide incentives for the prosecution of these claims. In effect,
these “consumer-friendly” provisions, which would pass the test under the
second prong of the “right to pursue statutory claims,” leave unaddressed the
potential chilling effect that class action waivers have on the ability of smallvalue claimants to vindicate their federal statutory rights. To make matters
worse, Scalia declares that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration
agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value
claims.”433
Amex has virtually eliminated the relevance of the availability of class
proceedings to effective-vindication inquires. The majority suggests that
class action waivers do not interfere with the “right to pursue” statutory
remedies because they “merely limit[] arbitration to the two contracting
parties.”434 It rejects “the argument that class arbitration [is] necessary to
prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the legal system.’”435


433. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5.
434. Id. at 2311.
435. Id. at 2307.
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The consequence is that it would be a fool’s errand to challenge the
enforcement of a class action waiver with respect to small-value claims.
The “savings clause” of the FAA remains an available method of
challenge.436 However, its scope limited; it permits courts to invalidate
arbitration agreements based on “generally applicable contract defenses,
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”437 Moreover, the availability of
the unconscionability challenge and the foundation for the first wave of
challenges to the enforcement of class action waivers438 have been
significantly limited by Concepcion.439 Concepcion decided that the
“savings clause” does not allow courts to invalidate arbitration agreements
based on “defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”440

B. Effective Vindication of State Rights
To what extent does Amex affect cases where state courts have used
the effective-vindication doctrine to invalidate arbitration agreements for
preventing the vindication of state, as opposed to federal, statutory rights?
This question did not arise directly in Amex; however, the opinions of both
the majority and the dissent suggest that the effective-vindication doctrine
does not apply to the vindication of state rights.
Some state courts have used effective-vindication arguments in
refusing to enforce class action waivers. For example, in Gentry v. Superior
Court,441 the California Supreme Court held that in some situations, class
action waivers in arbitration agreements “would undermine the vindication
of the employees’ unwaivable statutory rights and would pose a serious
obstacle to the enforcement of [state statutes.]”442 The Gentry rule called for
California courts to invalidate arbitration agreements containing class action
waivers where a review of relevant factors443 indicates that “class arbitration


436. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
437. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
438. See Gilles, supra note 239, at 399.
439. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (noting that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration.”).
440. Id. at 1746.
441. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007).
442. Id. at 450.
443. The case involved a claim for violation of statutory rights to overtime pay. According to
the court, the relevant factors include the size of the potential recovery and “other real world
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is likely to be a significantly more effective means of vindicating [state
statutory rights] than individual litigation or arbitration, and . . . that the
disallowance of class action will likely lead to a less comprehensive
enforcement of [the applicable state statute].”444 The Gentry rule was a
clarification of the Discover Bank rule445 that was invalidated by
Concepcion.
It is doubtful that the Gentry rule survived Concepcion, which clearly
indicated that state courts may not condition the enforcement of arbitration
agreements on the availability of class proceedings. The continued validity
of the rule is currently under review by the California Supreme Court
in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation of Los Angeles.446 Several federal
decisions have held that the rule did not survive Concepcion,447 and
California decisions have questioned its continued validity.448
There is, in fact, no principled basis for distinguishing the Gentry rule
from the Discover Bank rule, which was invalidated in Concepcion. Like in
the Discover Bank rule, the Gentry rule calls for the invalidation of class
action waivers where this is compelled by an evaluation of factors, such as
size of the potential individual recovery, the inequality in bargaining power
of the parties, and “other real world obstacles” to the individual prosecution


obstacles to the vindication of class member’s rights to overtime pay through individual arbitration.”
Id. at 568.
444. Id.
445. The Gentry court stated that it had granted review “to clarify our holding in Discover
Bank,” Id. at 560.
446. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. of L.A. L.L.C., 286 P.3d 147 (2012).
447. See, e.g., Morvant v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp.2d 831, 840 (N.D.Cal.
2012) (“[T]he Court can find no principled basis to distinguish between Discover Bank, which was
expressly overruled in Concepcion, and Gentry”); Sanders v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC., 843 F.
Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Concepcion 'effectively overrules Gentry' because
Gentry prohibits the arbitration of claims brought under California labor laws in certain
contexts.”); Lewis v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 818 F. Supp.2d 1161, 1167 (N.D.Cal. 2011)
("Conception effectively overrules Gentry”).
448. See, e.g., Truly Nolen of Am. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 435 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012), (“Although Conception's reasoning strongly suggests that Gentry's holding is
preempted by federal law, the United States Supreme Court did not directly rule on the class
arbitration issue in the context of unwaivable statutory rights and the California Supreme Court has
not yet revisited Gentry”.); Kinecta Alternative Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. Rptr.
3d 347, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) ("A question exists about whether Gentry survived the overruling
of Discover Bank in Concepcion, but it is not one we need to decide.”); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery
Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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of claims.449 This analysis essentially involves the evaluation of state policy
considerations, which Concepcion rejected as grounds for invalidating class
action waivers in arbitration agreements. As the Court stressed in
Concepcion, regardless of how desirable a particular procedure may be in
light of state policy interests, a state may not enact such a procedure if it is
inconsistent with the FAA.450 Moreover, Concepcion has made it clear that
a state may not require the availability of classwide arbitration as a condition
for enforcing arbitration agreements as this would “interfere[] with
fundamental attributes of arbitration.”451
Amex rejects the arguments for requiring availability of classwide
arbitration as a condition for enforcing arbitration agreements. According to
Scalia, Concepcion “specifically rejected the argument that class arbitrations
was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the
legal system.’”452 To buttress this point, Scalia noted, “the FAA . . .
favor[s] the absence of litigation when that is the consequence of a classaction waiver, since its ‘principal purpose’ is the enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to their terms.”453
The cumulative effect of Amex and Concepcion is effectively to
abrogate the Gentry rule. Amex reiterated the preemption of state rules that
condition the enforceability of arbitration agreements based on the
availability of class proceedings, even when these rules are aimed at
ensuring the vindication of state statutory rights.
Post-Concepcion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
articulated an effective-vindication theory that seeks to invalidate class
action waivers that preclude a party from vindicating state statutory rights.
In Feeney v. Dell Inc.454 the court held that the effective-vindication doctrine
may be used to invalidate a class action waiver “where the class waiver
provision has conferred on the defendant de facto immunity from private
civil liability for violations of State law.”455 This would be the case “where
plaintiff can demonstrate that he or she lacks the ability to pursue a claim
against the defendant in individual arbitration according to the terms of the


449. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005).
450. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748, 1753.
451. Id. at 1748.
452. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2307.
453. Id. at 2312 n.5.
454. Feeney v. Dell Inc., 989 N.E.2d 439, 460 (Mass. 2013).
455. Id.
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agreement.”456 The court required an individual factual inquiry to determine
whether “class proceedings are the only viable way for a consumer . . . to
bring a claim against a defendant, as may be the case where the claims are
complex, the damages are demonstrably small and the arbitration agreement
does not feature the safeguards found in the Concepcion agreement.”457 The
court was particularly concerned that businesses should not be allowed “[t]o
use class action waivers as a means to exculpate themselves from liability
for small value claims.”458
Even if it was previously in dispute whether Concepcion foreclosed this
application of the effective-vindication rule, Amex makes it clear that it does.
The concern of ensuring the prosecution of small value claims, which
underlay the Feeney decision, has been rendered irrelevant by Scalia’s
declaration that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements
trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.”459
Moreover, Amex reiterated the Court’s rejection of the necessity of class
proceedings for prosecuting claims that may “slip through the legal
system.”460
There remains the important question whether the effective-vindication
doctrine is even relevant in the context of the vindication of state, as
opposed to federal, statutory rights. The effective-vindication doctrine has
traditionally been viewed as a mechanism for resolving the tension between
the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA, and the realization of the policies
embodied in other federal command statutes. The assumption is that in
commanding the enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA,
Congress did not intend to undermine the vindication of rights it creates in
other statutes. The doctrine enables courts to refuse to enforce arbitration
agreements despite the pro-arbitration mandate of the FAA in cases that
would preclude a claimant from vindicating his or her federal statutory
rights. This reconciliation of tension is not relevant where a state law is
inconsistent with the FAA, as the latter would preempt the former under the


456. Id.
457. Id. at 501-02.
458. Id. at 444 (citing an earlier decision in Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th
Cir. 2007)).
459. Amex, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 n.5 (2013).
460. Id. at 2307.
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Supremacy Clause.461 As a court has noted, “there is no principled reason to
apply the [effective-vindication] doctrine to bar arbitration claims grounded
in state laws which were not created by Congress.”462
Although Scalia did not directly discuss whether the effectivevindication doctrine applies in connection with state laws,463 Kagan clarifies
the reach of the doctrine. According to her, the doctrine is an important
“limiting principle, designed to safeguard federal rights . . . .”464 She
distinguished preemption analysis, which is relevant when a state law
conflicts with the FAA, and an effective-vindication inquiry, which is
relevant “when the FAA is alleged to conflict with another federal law.”465
She stresses that in the federal context “one law does not automatically bow
to the other.”466 Consequently, the doctrine serves the function of
reconciling any tension between the FAA and other federal laws.467
Because the doctrine is limited to the federal context, it cannot be the
basis for sustaining the application of a state rule that conflicts with the
FAA. As Concepcion makes clear, state laws that “stand[] as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [the
FAA]”468 are preempted by the FAA, even when they promote desirable
social ends. The Feeney court acknowledged this point, noting that its rule
invalidating class-waivers in arbitration agreements where they preclude the
vindication of state statutory rights was sound “not because it can be
harmonized with the FAA,” but because it believed that the rule did not
conflict with the FAA.469 However, Amex now makes it clear that such a
rule conflicts with the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements.


461. See Gilles, supra note 254, at 641 (explaining the difference between preemption and
effective-vindication analysis).
462. Orman v. Citigroup, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131532, 9 (S.D.N.Y., 2012). See also
Kilgore v. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F. 3d 947, 961 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, 697 F. 3d 1181
(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the limits on the reach of the FAA “may be found only in other federal
statutes, not in state law or policy”), aff’d en banc, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013).
463. Scalia references the respondent by saying that the doctrine “serves to harmonize
competing federal policies by allowing courts to invalidate agreements that prevent the ‘effective
vindication’ of a federal statutory right.” Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. Scalia, however, did not express
his view on whether the doctrine applies only to the harmonization of federal statutes.
464. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., concurring).
465. Id. at 2320. (emphasis in original).
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
469. Feeney v. Dell Inc., 465 Mass. 470, 494. As argued above, Amex now makes it clear that
the rule conflicts with the FAA.
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V. THE CASE FOR A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
By limiting the availability of the effective-vindication doctrine and by
stressing that the FAA “trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of
low-value claims,”470 Amex weakens the protections and rights afforded to
consumers, employees, and others by federal statutes. In the wake of Amex
and Concepcion, a carefully worded arbitration agreement containing a class
action waiver might make it practically unfeasible for prospective claimants
to vindicate their statutory rights. Together, both decisions significantly
limit the mechanisms for resisting enforcement of arbitration agreements
that operate substantively to limit access to justice.471
After Concepcion, it was no longer permissible for states to condition
enforcement of arbitration agreements on the availability of class
proceedings. Amex added that the availability of class proceedings is not
necessary for the effective vindication of statutory rights,472 even where such
proceedings are the only viable mechanism for prosecuting such statutory
claims. We are told that it is relevant that these claims may fall through the
cracks of the system and go without redress.473 According to the Court in
Amex, the interest in enforcing arbitration agreements supersedes the interest


470. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5.
471. Amex compounds the negative effect Concepcion has had on access to justice. Following
the Court’s decision in Concepcion, one commentator noted: “The notion that an injured person has
a right to his or her day in court is deeply ingrained in American culture. But the proliferation of
arbitration agreements, and the Supreme Court’s aggressive enforcement of them, means that it is
increasingly a myth that an injured person can sue.” See Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., Supreme
Court:
Class
(action)
dismissed,
L.A.
TIMES,
May
10,
2011.)
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/10/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-class-action-20110510.
Amex
has now made it clear that the interest in the aggressive enforcement of arbitration agreements
“trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.” See Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312
n.5.
472. While class proceedings have their limitations, they serve as a crucial mechanism for
protecting the interest of consumers and employees. As one commentator has observed, there are
ongoing legislative efforts to reform the class action procedures and it is this legislative procedure;
Congress as well as federal and state rules committees, “rather than companies themselves, are best
positioned to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of class actions and refine the rules as needed. We
should not allow companies to shortcut the legislative process by using arbitration to abolish class
actions.” Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 725 (2012).
473. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312.
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in ensuring that claimants are able in practice to seek redress for violations
of their statutory rights.
Amex stresses that that the FAA embodies the “overarching principle
that arbitration is a matter of contract”474 and indicates “courts must
‘rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.’”475 It is
trite that arbitration is a matter of contract and is based on the consent of the
parties. What is often lost in this declaration of principle is the reality that in
most consumer transactions and employment relations, consumers and
employees do not have the bargaining power to negotiate predispute
arbitration agreements that would enable them adequately to protect their
statutory rights. This is not an argument against enforcing arbitration
agreements in consumer and employment contracts,476 but one for caution in
reviewing the use of arbitration in these areas.477
The Discover Bank rule478 was motivated in part by the recognition that
inequality in bargaining power between contracting parties may result in an
arbitration that operates essentially to immunize the stronger party from
liability for injury to the weaker party.479 The Discover Bank court used
unconscionability analysis to invalidate a category of these agreements.
Concepcion severely limited the scope of unconscionability challenges to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. To compound this trend, Amex now
makes it clear that the effective-vindication doctrine, hitherto considered a
viable, if limited, method of protecting statutory rights, confers only a
notional “right to pursue” statutory remedies. Amex construes this right so
narrowly that it would scarcely be of use to most prospective claimants.


474. Id. at 2309.
475. Id. (citation omitted).
476. In fact, arbitration has some useful benefits in the resolution of certain consumer and
employment disputes. See, e.g., George Padis, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming Consumer and
Employment Arbitration and Class Actions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 665, 691-96 (2013) (noting that
arbitration, in some contexts, offers benefits to consumers and employees).
477. For a discussion of the case for reform instead of abolishing the use of arbitration the use
of arbitration in consumer and employment transactions, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and
Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration
Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 469 (2011) (arguing for reform of the arbitration regime
instead of abolishing the use of arbitration in consumer and employment transactions, “so that
consumer arbitration may truly become a useful and beneficial alternative dispute resolution
process.”).
478. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal 2005); see supra text
accompanying note 256.
479. Id. at 1110. Part of the relevant factors under the rule was whether “the party with the
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money.” Id.
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In addition to the problem of unequal bargaining power, there are also
other structural issues that sometimes negatively affect perception of the
fairness of the arbitration process, particularly in the consumer and
employment contexts. These structural issues, such as “repeat player
effect”480 and structurally biased arbitration agreements, necessitate a
legislative framework for ensuring that arbitration is a fair and neutral
process for resolving consumer and employment disputes.481 This is
especially necessary because these disputes typically implicate statutory
rights serving important public policy goals.
Furthermore, Amex will have the effect of inhibiting the realization of
the deterrence function of federal command statutes by shifting the focus of
effective-vindication analysis to the ability of individual claimants to
exercise their “right to pursue” statutory claims, and by not considering the
chilling effect arbitration agreements may have in precluding prospective
claimants from vindicating their rights.
The Court has previously
acknowledged the importance of the deterrence function of these statutes in
the context of arbitration,482 but the practical consequence of its decision in
Amex and Concepcion is to inhibit the realization of this function by
enabling some businesses to practically immunize themselves from liability
for violations of these statutes.483
The United States is exceptional in the sense of not affording some
protections to consumers with respect to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.484 As one commentator has noted, “[t]he United States has been
exceptional in its strict enforcement of [Business-to-Consumer]
arbitration . . . while other nations have refused or limited enforcement of


480. For a discussion of this effect in the employment context, see Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997).
481. See Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All
or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 311-14 (2012) (stressing the need for procedural
safeguards in employment arbitrations.).
482. See supra text accompanying note 128.
483. See Sternlight, supra note 471, at 704 (noting that Concepcion afforded “companies with
free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful acts without fear of being sued.”).
484. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, American Exceptionalism in Consumer Arbitration, 10
LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 81, 83 (2012) (arguing that unlike the United States, other countries
restrict the availability of arbitration in consumer transactions; Schmitz examined the practice in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.).
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these arbitrations due to public policy.”485 The Court compounded this
problem. It gave an expansive interpretation to the FAA, in the process
broadening its scope,486 while paying scant attention to the need to ensure
that the arbitral process does not become a means for some businesses to
immunize themselves from liability for violating statutory rights. Left
unchecked, the Court’s trend towards whittling down the range of defenses
available against the enforcement of arbitration agreements—a trend
exemplified by the narrowing of the effective-vindication defense in Amex—
would lead to the continuing erosion of the substantive rights conferred by
statutes.
A legislative response has become necessary to regulate the use of
arbitration agreements outside the business-to-business context in which
arbitrations were historically used.487 At the time the FAA was drafted,
arbitration was used mostly in commercial transactions. The proliferation of
arbitration agreements in consumer and employment transactions is a more
recent phenomenon,488 necessitating the clarification of the limits and
standards for the use of arbitration in these contexts.
The ability of courts to play an active role in policing the use of
arbitration in these areas has been hampered by the Supreme Court’s
expansive interpretation of the FAA. As a result, courts “have largely
abdicated their policing responsibilities.”489 Furthermore, the ability of
states to regulate the use of arbitration in these areas is limited. With the
Court’s expansive reading of the FAA and the preemptive force of the Act,
the “savings clause” is about the only mechanism available to states to
safeguard against abuses in arbitration.490 As the Court has made clear,


485. Id. at 103.
486. See generally Margaret Moses, supra note 8, at 157 (arguing that the Court has
misconstrued the FAA).
487. See Padis, supra note 470, at 672 (noting that “the FAA’s original purpose was to secure
enforcement of predispute arbitration in merchant-commercial contracts.”).
488. Id. at 679-80 (discussing the proliferation of arbitration agreements in employment and
consumer transactions in the last two decades).
489. Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not be an All or
Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 301-11 (2012) (discussing the need to police abusive
provisions in employment arbitration agreements and the failure of courts to perform this function
adequately).
490. See Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Reining in Judicial
Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385, 388-89 (2007) (discussing the attenuated role of
state legislatures in regulating arbitrations).
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“Congress intended to foreclose state legislature attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements.”491
Consequently, legislative efforts to reform the use of arbitration have to
come from Congress. Some members of Congress have proposed bills to
regulate the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements in certain
transactions, although none of these bills have made it outside the committee
stage.492 Although these efforts have not been successful, they demonstrate
an awareness of the need to safeguard abuses of the arbitral process. For
example, the “findings” section of the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007 makes the case for reform:
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the United States
Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally similar
sophistication and bargaining power.
(2) A series of United States Supreme Court decisions have changed the meaning of the
Act so that it now extends to disputes between parties of greatly disparate economic
power, such as consumer disputes and employment disputes. . . .
(7) Many corporations add to their arbitration clauses unfair provisions that deliberately
tilt the systems against individuals, including provisions that strip individuals of
substantive statutory rights, ban class actions, and force people to arbitrate their claims
hundreds of miles from their homes. While some courts have been protective of
individuals, too many courts have upheld even egregiously unfair mandatory arbitration
clauses in deference to a supposed Federal policy favoring arbitration over the
493
constitutional rights of individuals.

The various iterations of the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act have
sought to limit the availability of predispute arbitration agreements in certain
transactions. For example, the 2013 version provides that “no predispute
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of
an employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil right
dispute.”494 Under this approach, these types of disputes would be amenable
to arbitration only where the parties enter into a post dispute arbitration


491. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). And the Court has not hesitated to
strike down state law, as it did in Perry v. Thomas, with respect to a state law restricting the
availability of arbitration in wage-and-hour claims. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
492. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong.(2007); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009, H.R. 1020 § 4, 111th Cong.(2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th
Cong. (2011).
493. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, id.
494. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 § 402(a), S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013).
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agreement. Presumably, at this point the weaker party would be better
equipped to make an informed decision whether to agree to arbitrate the
dispute.495 However, the chances of enacting the proposed bill in the current
political climate in Washington are slim.496
One area in which there has been some legislative success is the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank),497 which established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB). Dodd-Frank empowered the agency to “prohibit or impose
conditions or limitations on the use of . . . arbitration of any future dispute
between parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of
conditions or limitations is in the public interest and of the protection of
consumers.”498 The Act also requires the Bureau to study the use of
arbitration in consumer transactions and report its findings to Congress.499
Congress would presumably take action to address any problems identified
in the report. Recently, the Bureau issued final rules prohibiting the use of
predispute arbitration agreements in mortgage and home equity loan
contracts.500 The Bureau has also launched an inquiry to determine “how
consumers and financial services companies are affected by arbitration and
arbitration clauses.”501 After completing the inquiry, the Bureau “will assess


495. For the case against restricting the availability of predispute arbitration agreement, see
Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267 (2008) (arguing that post dispute arbitration is not a viable
alternative to enforcing predispute arbitration agreements).
496. According to govtrack.us the 2013 bill has 9% chance of getting past the committee stage
and 3% chance of being enacted into law. See http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1844
(last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
497. 12 U.S.C. § 5301.
498. Dodd-Frank, id. § 1028(b). Under § 1002 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Bureau is
limited to the consumer laws enumerated in that section. It should also be noted that the Act also
prohibits the use of predispute arbitration agreements in mortgage and home equity loan contract.
Section 1414(e)(1) provides that “[n]o residential mortgage loan and no extension of credit under an
open end consumer credit plan secured by the principal dwelling of the consumer may include terms
which require arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any
controversy or settling any claims arising out of the transaction.”
499. Dodd-Frank, id. § 1028(a).
500. The rule issued on June 1, 2013 provides that “[a] contract or other agreement for a
consumer credit transaction secured by a dwelling (including a home equity line of credit secured by
the consumer’s principal dwelling) may not include terms that require arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure to resolve any controversy or settle any claim arising out of the transaction.”
501. CFPB
PRESS
RELEASE
(Apr.
24,
2012),
available
at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launchespublic-inquiry-into-arbitration-clauses/.
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whether imposing conditions or prohibitions on arbitration clauses would
better protect consumers and serve the public interest.”502
Although the efforts in Congress to reform the use of arbitration have
so far been met with limited success, Amex will add to the widening call for
a broad legislative solution to the problem of access to justice in arbitration.
CONCLUSION

Amex has brought into sharper focus the need to reform the FAA,
especially as it relates to the arbitration of consumer and employment
disputes. These types of disputes often require the application of statutes
designed to protect consumers and employees. Consequently, it is crucial
that arbitration is an effective and fair mechanism for redressing injury for
violations of these protective statutes. The FAA was drafted at a time when
arbitration was infrequently used to resolve consumer and employment
disputes. It is therefore not surprising that it does not contain safeguards that
guarantee that arbitration is utilized legitimately in these areas. As
arbitration is increasingly used as a method of resolving these disputes, the
case for safeguards becomes evident.
Unfortunately, Amex is the latest illustration of the Court’s
unwillingness to provide the necessary safeguards. It has instead chosen to
interpret the FAA, originally conceived to promote the arbitration of
commercial disputes, in a manner that substantially weakens protections for
consumers and employees, and restricts access to arbitral justice. For the
Court, promoting the efficiency of arbitration has become an overriding
consideration. In the view of the Court, neither the interest in promoting
fairness nor the need for effective redress for violations of vital statutory
rights can interfere with the efficiency of arbitration.
However, if the arbitral process is perceived as unfair, the public will
begin to question its legitimacy as a mechanism for resolving disputes.
Certainly, arbitration provides the important benefit of a flexible and
efficient method of resolving disputes. Nonetheless, it will continue to play
this vital role only if the public retains confidence in the fairness of
arbitration. As this paper has argued, corrective reforms are necessary to
restore the legitimacy of arbitration.


502. Id.
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The time has come for Congress to reform the FAA. Because of the
limitations the Supremacy Clause places on the ability of states to enact
necessary reforms, states are unable to perform this function. Additionally,
the Court has been reluctant to interpret the FAA in a manner that would
guarantee the fairness of the arbitral process.
Recent decisions of the Court threaten to make arbitration “a mechanism
easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and
insulate wrongdoers from liability.”503 Congress should act to ensure that
arbitration continues to perform its vital and historical function as “a way of
using tailored and streamlined procedures to facilitate redress of injuries.”504


503. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2320.
504. Id.
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